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ABSTRACT 
 
Explaining Depiction: 
Recent Debates in the Philosophy of  
Pictorial Representation 
 
by 
 
LEUNG Chi Kei Solly 
 
Master of Philosophy 
 
 
 This thesis begins with a succinct survey of theories of depiction and then turns 
to two highly influential contemporary philosophical accounts, namely, the 
aspect-recognition theory proposed by Dominic McIver Lopes, and Robert 
Hopkins’s experienced resemblance theory. The latter two theories of pictorial 
representation are presented in detail before objections to both accounts are 
presented and assessed.  
One of the central contentions of the thesis is that the aspect-recognition theory 
succumbs to a number of serious objections. First of all, this account rests upon a 
philosophically problematic notion of semantic information and consequently fails 
to account adequately for the possibility of misrepresentation. Arguably the theory 
entails that all pictures are misrepresentational. It is also argued that Lopes’s claim 
that all pictures are belief-independent is unsound. Criticisms of Hopkins’s account 
of depiction developed in the thesis focus on problems raised by photographic 
depiction as well as ways in which the ambiguity of the notion of ‘experienced 
resemblance’ blurs the distinction between misrepresentation and indeterminacy of 
outline shape. It is also contended that a notion that is fundamental to Hopkins’s 
account--experienced resemblance in outline shape—leads to problems that are at 
least as serious as those it would appear to solve. The thesis concludes with a brief 
assessment of the state of the art of philosophical accounts of depiction. While 
progress has been made, especially with regard to the clarification of key questions, 
we still do not have anything like a comprehensive final theory of depiction.
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 It is said that in Raphael’s The School of Athens, we can find a depiction of 
nearly every Greek philosopher, although we might have difficulties in identifying 
which ones are depicted since Raphael did not leave any personal notes on the topic. 
Still, some of them can be identified by their characteristics depicted in the painting. 
For example, the Vatican Museums Online website introduces the second man, who 
is writing on a book, in the bottom left, as Pythagoras, and the man on the right 
teaching geometry as Euclid. It is uncontroversial that the aged, wise man, who is 
dressed in a red robe in the middle of the painting, is Plato, while the middle-aged 
man, dressed in blue and next to Plato is Aristotle. However, other figures in the 
painting are far more controversial than these two, and it is highly possible that we 
may never be able to definitely determine who they are if there is no further 
discovery of evidence pertaining to the painting. 
 In the painting, Plato is represented as pointing towards the heaven, and 
Aristotle is represented as gesturing towards the ground. Their gestures are said to 
be representing their philosophy—the former represents Plato’s appeal to the realm 
of ideal forms, while the latter represents Aristotle’s insistence on building 
knowledge on observation of the material world. 
 In the paragraph above, the word “represent” was used several times; however, 
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the word does not seem to carry the same meaning in each case. For ‘Plato is 
represented as pointing towards heaven’, means that we see Plato pointing his finger 
towards the sky, and in this case the representation is visual. However, one may ask 
how we know that the person in the middle wearing the red robe is Plato? Why 
couldn’t this figure be plausibly interpreted as representing Aristotle? And why do 
we say that Plato is pointing towards heaven while we only see from the painting 
that he points upwards? We can also extend the question to other figures in the 
painting. Why is it indisputable that the two men in the middle are Plato and 
Aristotle, while the identities of some of the other figures in the painting are 
controversial? It would seem that these questions cannot be answered by appeal to 
visual perception alone. Our beliefs or cognition also contributes to our 
understanding of pictorial representation: we need concepts and background 
knowledge to interpret what we perceive visually. Similar circumstances obtain for 
the other senses, such as sound and scent. When we heard a sound, what we perceive 
is vibrations with certain frequencies. The perception of the sound is then processed 
by our cognition—we search our memory for similar frequencies that we have heard, 
the similar experience that we have had in similar situations, and we then associate 
the concepts in our knowledge with the sound that we just heard. In the case of The 
School of Athens, we identify the figures by their characteristic poses and their 
activities. Concepts and background knowledge are therefore also crucial in the 
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process of identification. Difficulties arise when we have no sufficient and decisive 
evidence supporting the identification of the figures. 
 Nonetheless, problems exist even for the uncontroversial figures like Plato and 
Aristotle. It is believed that Raphael depicts Plato with the appearance of Leonardo 
da Vinci. This means that Plato did not actually possess the characteristics that we 
perceive him as having in the painting. The question is: who is the man in the middle 
with the red robe in the painting? Is he Plato or Leonardo? It is legitimate for us to 
reply that the figure is Plato, yet someone may reply in a more delicate way: it is a 
pictorial representation of Plato with an appearance resembling Leonardo da Vinci. 
Can an object be represented with characteristics that it does not really have? The 
answer would seem to be obvious: yes, it can. Just imagine a general using 
paperweights to represent his enemies on a map. We can reframe the question more 
precisely: can an object be represented pictorially with characteristics that it does 
not really have? If the answer is yes, then we may wonder how? One may also 
wonder what is the difference between representing an object pictorially and 
representing the object by other means? And is there any difference between 
representing an existing object and a fictional object, for example, a unicorn? 
Philosophers have for quite some time been trying to answer these and other 
puzzling questions about this distinctive kind of representation, namely, depiction. 
One reason why the questions are puzzling is that some of them have not been 
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clearly articulated. In an attempt to rectify this situation, in my first chapter, I will 
identify a number of possible questions that arise in the discussion of depiction.  
 The discussion of depiction can be traced back as far as Plato in ancient 
Greece. In this relatively short thesis it will be impossible to attempt a detailed 
historical survey, and I shall instead only focus on important contemporary theories, 
especially those presented by Robert Hopkins and Dominic Lopes, in the third and 
fourth chapter. I will reconstruct and discuss their theories in detail, and state 
objections that have been put against them. In chapter seven and chapter eight, I will 
raise my own criticisms of Hopkins’s and Lopes’s proposal individually. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
QUESTIONS ABOUT PICTURES 
 
It may be doubted whether it is necessary, or even possible, to give an accurate 
definition of ‘picture’. However, pointing out the important characteristics of 
pictures will be helpful in understanding the nature of depiction. In answering a 
question as simple as ‘what is a picture?’, one may say that it is a physical object 
that occupies a spatial and temporal location, just as a book or a piece of paper does. 
Although this conception may fit paintings in museums and other places, it does not 
apply very neatly to pictures appearing on computer screens or huge LCD displays 
in Times Square or Queen’s Road in Hong Kong. Perhaps it would be good enough 
to say, then, that a surface is necessary for something to be a picture. For both The 
School of Athens, or a Coca Cola advertisement on an LCD screen, have a surface. 
For paintings, there are marks consisting of paint and other materials on a surface; 
however, when it comes to an electronic display like LCD screen, the marks are in 
the surface. Perhaps it is possible for such images to be analyzed in terms of pixels 
or other elements of a visual array that appear in or constitute a visible surface. 
Since the ontology of paintings and other visual depictions is not my concern in this 
essay, I shall assume that the difference between marks on or in the surface is not 
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significant, and I will use ‘on the surface’ in what follows for convenience. 1 
Another important question can be framed as follows: what are these marks? 
These marks are determinant in deciding both what a painting is and what a painting 
is about. These marks contribute to various visual properties including lines with 
different thickness, shapes, colours, etc. I borrow the term ‘design properties’ from 
Dominic Lopes to describe these visual properties; we can then go on to say that the 
design properties make up the ‘design’ of a picture. The ways marks are formed 
determine the presence of certain design properties. Artists paint in various ways. 
For example, some of them apply heavy and obvious brushstrokes on the surface, 
which is often a canvas. Therefore we can find design properties such as the 
visibility of brushstroke and thickness of pigment in painting; however, these design 
properties are not applicable to some pictures, such as those in slide shows or in 
LCD displays, since in these surfaces, the ways the marks are formed are different 
from those of painting on canvas. The differences between the physical properties of 
marks lead to different interests that we have towards corresponding surfaces. For 
example, artists may be interested in the heavy and bold brushworks in impressionist 
paintings; while some historians are interested in the event a photograph shows due 
to the verisimilitude brought about by the automatism of photography. Philosophers, 
 
1 There is not much discussion on the ontology or definition of images, especially in 
paintings and drawings, in existing literatures. For background on the ontology of 
images, see Davies 2008, and Ponech 2006.  
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on the other hand, have taken an interest in the general relation between the marks 
and the contents of pictures. 
The content of a picture is always at least in part the result of the design of the 
picture. We can see some male figures, architectural features, etc, in the design of 
The School of Athens, and that gives us part of the content of the painting. In 
Jackson Pollock’s Number 30, what we can see is only the design resulting from 
paint having been dripped and splashed all over the canvas. Philosophers contend 
that pictures like The School of Athens are figurative, and they represent pictorially; 
while pictures like Number 30 represent by other means (if at all). Pictorial 
representation is a distinctive kind of representation, and it has standardly been 
called ‘depiction’ in the philosophical tradition. The entities that a picture depicts are 
its subjects. The subject of a picture, which can be fictive or real, is often decided by 
its creator—in many cases, the artist. The artist creates and arranges the design 
properties of a picture that pictorially represents its subjects. The spectator sees the 
surface of a picture and the subjects depicted. The most puzzling part is how the 
spectator sees the subjects from the design of the picture, which consists of different 
design properties. Before taking up this most puzzling topic, we first have to 
formulate our questions correctly and carefully in order to have an effective and 
efficient discussion. To that end, I shall now examine how the questions have been 
framed by two prominent participants in the resent valuable and lively philosophical 
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debate on depiction—Dominic Lopes and Robert Hopkins. 
 
The Questions Concerning Depiction 
In his paper, “Pictures and the Representational Mind” (2003) , the first 
question Lopes purposes is: 
L1: “what is a representational picture?” (633)  
The answer to this question would be a “theory of pictures”. As I have pointed out, 
we can search for a definition of all pictures, including figurative and abstract 
pictures. However, such a broad definition is not necessary for our purpose, which is 
the understanding of the nature of depiction. Therefore, what Lopes means by a 
“theory of pictures” is indeed a theory of representational pictures. The second 
question that he asks is 
L2: What is the relationship between experiences of seeing the subject in the picture 
and experiences of actually seeing the subject in person? 
This question concerns the nature of the experience that we have of the subjects in 
pictures. Lopes contends that when one is looking at the subject in the picture, one 
always has “an experience as of” the subject. However, it is obvious that our 
experience of the subject in the picture differs greatly from our experience of the 
subject in person, for the former experience is about a static, flat, and 
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two-dimensional surface with marks, while the later is about a three-dimensional 
object. A theory of pictorial experience is needed to explain this phenomenon. The 
third question that Lopes raises is: 
L3: Why do we see particular objects in the marks on a picture surface, rather than 
seeing something else? 
We see two male figures in the middle of the design of The School of Athens, which 
are Plato and Aristotle, but why are these figures the pictorial representation of Plato 
and Aristotle rather than other objects, say, two horses or two towers? A theory of 
depiction is necessary to answer this kind of question. 
 These three questions are indeed closely related. We can use a theory of 
pictorial experience to answer L3, the question of depiction. We see the particular 
object in the design of the picture because the experience that we have when we 
look at the picture determines what the picture represents. This is the stance 
embraced by Richard Wollheim, Christopher Peacocke, Robert Hopkins, and John 
Hyman. One can also answer L2 in terms of the answer to L3; we can explain the 
experience that we have when looking at a picture by appealing to a theory of 
depiction. We have an experience “as of” the subject because the subject is 
pictorially represented by the picture. This explains why the experience has a 
content involving the subject in the picture. This is the stance embraced by Lopes. 
Similarly, we can answer the question about what a representational picture is by 
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appealing to either a theory of pictorial experience or a theory of depiction. The 
design of a picture represents the subjects, thus the picture is a representation of its 
subjects by inducing content-specific experiences in spectators. One can also 
approach the question by appealing to a theory of depiction. For example, some 
theorists use representational theories of signs and symbols, like languages, to define 
what a picture is.  
After looking at how Lopes formulates questions concerning pictures and 
pictorial representation, we turn to Robert Hopkins’ formulations.  
[H]1 What is a picture? 
[H]2 What is pictorial representation? 
[H]3 What is the experience pictures characteristically generate? 
[H]4 What is it to understand a picture? (Hopkins 2003, 653) 
Hopkins’ formulations are similar to those of Lopes. H1 searches for a theory of 
pictures. However, when one says that a picture is a representation, the question that 
follows is what kind of representation is it? It is possible, and indeed probable, that 
pictures involve various kinds of representation, such as pictorial representation and 
semiotic representation. As searching for a definition of pictures is laborious and, 
maybe, fruitless, one narrows the scope and searches for the nature of pictorial 
representation. H2 searches for a theory of pictorial representation, or what we 
called a theory of depiction, and we can approach the question by the answers to H3 
or H4, which are, Hopkins contends, respectively, the experiential approach and 
recognitional approach to depiction. An experiential account of depiction explains 
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our understanding of a picture based on the experience elicited by the picture when 
‘we’(normal human subjects) look at it: we understand the picture as what the 
elicited experience is. Conversely, the recognitional account of depiction claims that 
we understand pictures by recognizing the subjects in pictures the way we recognize 
the subjects in the flesh. And it is this understanding that explains the nature of 
depiction. Advocates of the recognition theory, like Schier and Lopes, do not 
necessarily reject experiences elicited by pictures since the experience that we have 
when we look at pictures can be the product of our understanding.  
After stating Lopes’s and Hopkins’s formulations of the questions, it is obvious 
that some of their formulations are similar, while some others are quite different. L1 
and H1 are similar since both ask for a definition of picture, and more specifically, 
representational pictures. However, Lopes and Hopkins have a disagreement here. 
Lopes thinks that there are pictures that are non-representational: “Some 
philosophers want to answer a much broader question about the nature of all pictures, 
including non-representational or abstract ones” (Lopes 2003, 634). On the contrary, 
what Hopkins says implies that all pictures are representational, although they 
represent in different ways: “Perhaps only pictures represent pictorially, but not all 
do: consider abstract paintings” (Hopkins 2003, 653). This leads to the debate 
whether all pictures are representational. If all pictures are representational, abstract 
painting or even doodles are representational as well. However, it is controversial 
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whether abstract paintings are representational, for the purpose of some abstract 
paintings is to present us with beautiful and visually interesting formal elements, 
like the contrast between colours, the relations between lines and shapes, etc. This 
traces back to the fundamental question that what a representation is. I shall not, 
however, survey this controversial notion of representation-in-general in this thesis. 
I shall adopt Lopes’s stance and assume that not all pictures are representational, as 
some, like abstract paintings, are non-representational. 
L2 and H3 both concern the nature of pictorial experience. Lopes and Hopkins 
offer similar interpretations of what is at bottom just one question, although they 
hold different opinions on the roles of pictorial experience in depiction. Lopes 
contends that pictorial experience is the product of depiction, while Hopkins 
contends that pictorial experience is the core of the theory of depiction.  
L3 and H2 are similar in seeking a theory of depiction. Both Lopes and 
Hopkins believe that the question can be answered by different theories of depiction, 
namely the experiential account or the recognitional account of depiction.  
Hopkins thinks that pictures play an important role in human communication. 
So our understanding of the content of pictures needs explanation. Therefore he 
includes H4 in his set of questions. However, it is not quite clear what Hopkins 
means by understanding. Is seeing what is depicted in the picture, as intended by the 
artist, an understanding of the picture? Take The School of Athens as an example. 
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Does one understand the picture when one sees the male figures and other subjects 
in the painting? Or is it necessary to identify some of the figures by name in order to 
have a real understanding of the picture? Furthermore, does one need to have the 
knowledge, which is exclusive to the painting, that the painting is actually meant in 
praise of antiquity? These and a host of similar questions that could be raised 
indicate that the notion of “understanding” is a vague one. The meaning of 
‘understand’ has to be clarified if we are to state its importance with any precision. 
One way this has been attempted is to postulate the existence of a specifically visual 
content that can either be understood or not. Either someone understands that a 
particular figure is depicted as pointing upwards or not. It is a separate question 
whether this figure is identified as Plato, Aristotle, or someone else, and quite 
another question whether the artist is understood as having expressed this or that 
attitude towards this ancient philosopher. Just as the name of his book 
Understanding Pictures suggests, Lopes equates the question of depiction and 
question of pictorial understanding. However, as what I have argued, these two 
questions, although they are intimately linked, deserve individual treatments.  
After analyzing the sets of questions in relation to depiction proposed by Lopes 
and Hopkins, I agree with Hopkins that a separate question of understanding of 
pictorial content should be included. Therefore, I would adopt Hopkins’s set of 
questions, which are: 
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Q1 What is a picture? 
Q2 What is pictorial representation? 
Q3 What is the experience pictures characteristically generate? 
Q4 What is it to understand a picture? (Hopkins 2003a, 653) 
After discussing the questions concerning pictorial representation, I now turn to a 
brief survey of various theories that try to explain depiction. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO EXISTING THEORIES OF DEPICTION 
 
The mimesis theory of representation was the dominant theory of depiction 
until the publication of Nelson Goodman’s influential book Languages of Art in 
1969. Since then, depiction has remained one of the central topics in aesthetics. In 
this chapter, I explore different theories of depiction—including the objective 
resemblance theory, the experienced resemblance theory, the semiotic theory, the 
illusion theory, the seeing-in theory, the make-believe theory, and the recognition 
theory, so as to provide the crucial background to a detailed discussion of Dominic 
Lopes’s aspect recognition theory and Robert Hopkins’s experienced resemblance 
theory.  
 
The Resemblance Theory 
In The Republic, book 10, Plato argues against painting because painting is just 
an imitation of appearance that is “far removed from truth”. Although Plato contends 
that painting, like other mimetic art forms, has a negative effect on the pursuit of the 
forms, he holds that mimetic art represents by imitating the appearance of its 
subjects. The imitation of appearance, resemblance in short, undeniably matches our 
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intuition of how pictorial representation works, and I shall call such a theory the 
‘objective resemblance theory’. The objective resemblance theory holds that a 
picture pictorially represents its subject only if the picture possesses an actual 
resemblance to its subject. However, in spite of his doubts about the very idea of 
‘objective resemblance’, Goodman refutes the objective resemblance theory by 
arguing that even if such a thing as objective resemblance exists, it is neither 
necessary nor sufficient for depiction. He argues that, first, resemblance is reflexive 
while depiction is not. X resembles itself, but x does not depict itself. Second, 
resemblance is symmetric while depiction is not. X resembles y as much as y 
resembles x; but while a picture, x, represents its subject, y, its subject y does not 
represent the picture. The above arguments prove that resemblance is not sufficient 
for representation. In addition, since everything may stand for any other thing (for 
someone), resemblance is not necessary for depiction. Therefore Goodman 
concludes that resemblance is neither necessary nor sufficient for depiction 
(Goodman 1976, 3-5).  
Although Goodman’s critique successfully points out the deficiencies of the 
objective resemblance theory, some philosophers have contended that some notions 
of resemblance can still play a role in the theory of depiction. I return to this topic in 
the last part of this chapter. 
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Following Goodman’s line, Lopes questions the resemblance theory with what 
he calls the ‘independent challenge’. With reference to Trevor Pateman and 
Margaret Deuchar (Lopes 1996, 16), Lopes proposes that sign languages can be 
divided into three categories. Some sign languages do not visually resemble their 
referents, so similarities perceived between these signs and what they stand for are 
independent of the understanding of these signs. The second category includes signs 
that can be understood by perceiving the similarities of the signs and their referents 
before knowing what they stand for, and these similarities are 
‘representation-independent’. As for the third category, in some cases the 
similarities of signs and their referents become obvious only when the meanings of 
the signs are known. This kind of resemblance is ‘representation-dependent’. Lopes 
argues that many resemblances between pictures and objects represented that we 
notice in everyday life are actually representational-dependent. Resemblance can be 
the product, rather than the origin, of our understanding of pictures. Since 
resemblance is inseparably connected to depiction, it is hard for us to determine 
whether it, as Goodman proposes, is the result of depiction, or is the origin of 
depiction. The independent challenge is the idea that although not all resemblances 
are necessarily representation-independent, resemblances that we have to perceive in 
order to identify the subject of a picture need to be representation-independent. This 
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means that we cannot explain what depiction is by merely appealing to resemblance 
intuitively; the resemblance theory has to prove that the resemblance used to explain 
depiction is representation-independent. Everything resembles other things in some 
aspects, but not everything depicts. Therefore the resemblance theory has to state 
what the resemblance is based on, and this basis has to be unique to pictures, 
otherwise depiction cannot be distinguished from other kinds of representations.  
One possible answer appeals to intended resemblance. There are a number of 
logically distinct theses related to both the notion of intention and resemblance, and 
a variety of theses can be constructed using different combinations of these notions. 
Lopes argues against a very strong thesis, which holds that a picture depicts the 
subject if and only if the artist intentionally painted the picture resembling the 
subject in some aspects. The School of Athens depicts Plato not only because part of 
the design resembles Plato, but also because Raphael intended to do so. However, 
Lopes argues, intended resemblance is not sufficient for depiction, for it fails to 
meet the independent challenge. Lopes writes, “on the one hand, to be guided by 
knowledge of how a picture is intended to resemble its subject is to seek 
representation-dependent similarities” (Lopes 1996, 19). If a perceiver cannot 
understand the picture and what it depicts only by noticing the resemblance of the 
picture and its subject, but must also know what the artist intended to represent, then 
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the resemblance that the perceiver notices is just representation-dependent. Second, 
intended resemblance is not sufficient for depiction. Carpets and wallpaper samples 
are intended to represent by resembling what they represent; however, they do not 
depict. Therefore the resemblance theory has to identify kinds of salient similarities 
in order to meet the independent challenge. I return later to other weaker intention 
conditions in the literature in chapter four for Hopkins’s experienced resemblance 
theory in outline shape.  
 
The Experienced Resemblance Theory 
In order to avoid the difficulties that the objective resemblance theory faces, 
some theorists, for example, Christopher Peacocke (Peacocke 1987), Robert 
Hopkins, and John Hyman (2006), defend the ‘experienced resemblance theory’. 
The experienced resemblance theory differs from the objective resemblance theory 
in that according to the former, the resemblance between the picture and its subject 
is not objective, but experiential (where the experience in question meets some 
standard of correctness). Although a picture resembles another picture much more 
than it resembles its subject, the experience that one appropriately has when looking 
at the painting resembles the experience of looking at the object face-to-face. The 
experienced resemblance theory is a generic categorization; different experienced 
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resemblance theories appeal to different aspects of the experience that enable such 
resemblance. For example, Hopkins appeals to the resemblance of outline shape 
between objects in the pictorial experience and the object in reality. Hopkins’s 
experienced resemblance theory will be discussed in detail in Chapter 4. 
 
The Semiotic Theory 
After rejecting the objective resemblance theory, Goodman introduces his 
semiotic theory of depiction. According to the semiotic theory, a picture represents 
by virtue of conventional symbol systems, in which rules and conventions are set up 
so that the users of the systems can understand what a given expression is about. We 
understand what a picture is about because the picture functions within a pictorial 
system and uses symbols that we have learnt. Since resemblance is not necessary 
and sufficient to pictorial representation, what a picture represents is solely 
determined by the rules and conventions of the system related to the picture being 
interpreted. We see an elegant woman in the Mona Lisa because the symbols that 
compose the design of the painting represent an elegant woman given our 
convention; a viewer from a fully distinct culture with different conventions may see 
a pink elephant in the painting because the same design may indeed represent a pink 
elephant according to some alternative conventions. Yet if that is so, what 
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distinguishes pictorial representation from other kinds of representation, say, 
languages? Goodman proposes that symbols in pictures are ‘analogue’ and 
‘relatively replete’. By ‘analogue’, Goodman means that the slightest change to a 
pictorial symbol would result in a different representation. Whereas the font of the 
inscription ‘dog’ is different from that in ‘dog’’, the change does not normally 
affect what the word means; however, even adding a single black dot to a picture of 
an apple could change the representation from an apple to an apple with a certain 
property, namely a black dot on its surface. Pictorial symbols are also relatively 
replete in the sense that surface properties of pictures are more representationally 
significant compared to other forms of representations. In other words, in a picture 
more surface properties are representationally relevant. The colour of a painting, the 
size and the thickness of brushstrokes, etc. affect the representational content of a 
picture. The precise width of the lines in the inscription of a character such as ‘g’ 
does not in the same way factor into the fact that the inscription is a token of the 
character-type ‘g’. 
 The semiotic account of depiction is appealing in some respects. First, pictures 
do have compositional elements just like languages. The composition of a picture is 
discussed as the arrangement of different parts and objects in a picture; different 
compositions deliver different meanings and represent differently. In this respect, 
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pictures have semantic properties. Second, the symbol system approach to depiction 
squares easily with the variety of pictorial styles. Pictures from different conventions 
differ in style; this may be due to the fact that pictures belong to different symbol 
systems, which may be as arbitrary as verbal languages. Nonetheless, the semiotic 
theory faces several challenges. First, even if pictorial styles are partially 
conventional, they do not have to be fully conventional, as Goodman suggests. 
According to Goodman, the content of a picture is determined entirely by the 
function of symbols in a certain pictorial system. The same content may represent 
differently in other systems. Hence, the content of a picture does not determine what 
the picture represents, but depends on the conventions and the rules of the pictorial 
system. However, it is far from obviously true that anything can visually depict 
anything; instead, it is more plausible to think that the visual design of a picture 
determines its specifically pictorial content, and that this content to some extent 
determines what the picture is about. In addition, when viewing a picture, we seem 
to understand what the picture means without relying on any concept of pictorial 
systems. Children can be observed to recognize the visual content of pictures at a 
stage in life where it is implausible to say that they have mastered a set of 
conventions or an arbitrary symbol-system. The second objection is closely related 
to the first: the arbitrariness that the semiotic theory postulates makes this theory 
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unable to account for the picture viewing experience, namely, the seeing-in 
experience. Following the semiotic theory, the viewing experience of pictures is the 
same as the experience of reading a description, and it is a mistake for semiotic 
theory to ignore the perceptual experience totally. Third, human beings possess some 
capacities pertaining to depiction that the semiotic theory cannot account for. 
Nowadays people learn about unseen objects largely by looking at pictures. Children 
learn what a lion looks like by seeing a photograph of a lion, and they are able to 
identify lions when they see real ones in a zoo. Pictorial systems cannot account for 
this human universal perceptual capacity since if pictorial symbols are arbitrary, the 
pictorial symbol that stands for lion in one symbol system may not be the same as 
the one that has the same function in another system. In addition, such a capacity is 
not found in sign systems such as languages, for by learning the word ‘lion’, one 
cannot know what lions look like when one encounters real lions2.  
 
The Illusion Theory 
Illusionism is another theory of depiction that originates from Plato’s 
discussion of mimetic art. The word ‘illusion’ is used in different ways in the 
 
2 For more detailed objections to Goodman’s semiotic theory of depiction, see 
Schier 1986. 
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literature. It is important to distinguish, for example, between illusion and delusion. 
Plato writes in Republic: 
[A] painter, we say, will paint us a cobbler, a carpenter, and other craftsmen, 
though he himself has no expertness in any of these arts, but nevertheless if he 
were a good painter, by exhibiting at a distance his picture of a carpenter he 
would deceive children and foolish men, and make them believe it to be a real 
carpenter. (598b-c) 
In Plato’s example, the children and the men do not only have an experience that is 
phenomenally indistinguishable from the experience of seeing the carpenter in 
person, they also have a belief that they are actually seeing the carpenter face to face; 
therefore Plato’s example is a case of delusion. A delusion differs from an illusion in 
the sense that delusion is necessarily cognitive, nonetheless, an illusion can be either 
perceptual or conceptual, or both. For example, when we look at a Ponzo’s illusion, 
although we suffer from the visual illusion that the upper line is longer than the 
lower line, we may have the knowledge, and hence the belief, that they are actually 
the same length. Therefore a perceptual illusion is not necessarily accompanied by a 
cognitive illusion. If an illusion is both perceptual and cognitive, then it is a delusion. 
The delusion theory of depiction receives little support nowadays since it does not 
normally match the viewing behaviors of spectators. Although the delusion theory 
fails to account for the viewing experiences of most kinds of pictures, it does explain 
that of some pictures, for example, trompe-l’œil pictures. 
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E. H. Gombrich is one of the advocates of illusion theory (Gombrich 1960). 
Gombrich holds that a picture depicts its object only if the picture elicits an illusion 
in its viewers to the effect that their experience of viewing the picture is 
phenomenally indistinguishable from viewing the object face-to-face. Although the 
illusion theory had been popular since its proposal by Descartes, it has very few 
advocates nowadays since it has some obvious deficiencies. The first problem with 
the illusion theory is that even if we grant that some pictures, like trompe-l’œil 
pictures, do elicit such illusions, not all pictures do. The experiences of viewing 
drawings, engravings, and some other kinds of paintings apparently differ from the 
experience of seeing the depicted objects face to face, and these pictures hardly elicit 
illusions. Second, illusion theory does not explain how the design features contribute 
to the representational content. According to Gombrich, one’s attention can only 
oscillate between seeing the designs on the surface, or seeing the objects represented; 
seeing both at the same time is impossible. 
 
The Seeing-in Theory 
 Although one may reject Gombrich’s claim that the viewing experiences of 
pictures are illusionistic, one can still explain depiction by appealing to viewing 
experience. Richard Wollheim’s ‘seeing-in’ theory is one of the influential 
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approaches to depiction in this vein. In “Seeing-as, seeing-in, and pictorial 
representation”, which is a chapter of his book Art and Its Objects, Wollheim (1980) 
contends that seeing-in is different from seeing-as in two respects. The first 
distinction between seeing-in and seeing-as is based on a linguistic constraint. 
Seeing-in allows not only particulars to be seen, but also states of affairs; whereas 
seeing-as does not allow states of affair to be seen, but only particulars:  
[T]he object of seeing-in may be given by a name or description but it may also 
be given by a sentential clause: however, the only licit way of giving the object 
of seeing-as is by use of a name or description. An example: If I am looking at 
x, and x is a particular, I can see a woman in x, and I can also see in x that a 
woman is reading a love-letter: but, whereas I can see x as a woman, I cannot 
see x as that a woman is reading a love-letter (Wollheim 1980, 210).  
The second difference between seeing-as and seeing-in according to Wollheim is the 
‘localization requirement’. When one sees x as y, there are some parts of x that one 
sees as y; in other words, if x is said to be seen as y, one has to be able to specify 
which part of x is seen as y. However, seeing-in need not meet the localization 
requirement since seeing-in is a kind of representational seeing; one “neither 
have[has] nor expected to have a responding answer” when one sees objects in a 
picture because one can answer no more than ‘I see the object in the picture’.  
Even though one may not agree with these two distinctions of seeing-as and 
seeing-in, seeing-in is used widely to describe our experience of seeing the object 
represented in pictures. According to Wollheim, seeing-in has two characteristics. 
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When we look at marks or patterns, no matter how they are made or where they are, 
we can freely associate these marks and patterns with objects that we imagine. One 
may see a rabbit in a cloud, or a battle in the stains on a wall. However, one would 
not necessarily say that the cloud depicts a rabbit, or that the wall depicts a battle. 
This is because in spite of the marks or patterns on the surface, there is a standard of 
correctness that governs what is correctly seen in the picture—namely, the artist’s 
intention. We might see a spider in Pollock’s Out of the Web, however, we are not 
suppose to see a spider in the painting because Pollock, who painted the painting, 
did not intend the viewers to see a spider in the painting; we are right to see a man 
with a red robe in the middle of The School of Athens because Raphael painted the 
surface with the intention that such figure could be seen by its viewers. This kind of 
intention, which partially governs the object of the representation when we see a 
picture, is the standard of correctness of pictorial representation. 
The second characteristic of seeing-in is twofoldness. Twofoldness is the idea 
that the experience of viewing a picture simultaneously involves an experience of 
seeing the designs on the surface and seeing the object represented. Wollheim offers 
different reasons in support of this famous claim about twofoldness. The first reason 
supporting twofoldness is that the uses of various design properties by painters are 
praised by spectators for producing different representational effects. These effects 
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can only be explained by our attention to both the design properties and the objects 
that we see in pictures. Wollheim also draws an analogy between pictures and poetry 
when we appreciate a poem, we are simultaneously aware of both the sounds and the 
meanings of the words. The second reason Wollheim proposes in supporting 
twofoldness is that the shapes of the object depicted in the picture do not show 
perspectival distortion, which is necessarily brought about in the case of viewing the 
actual object face-to-face when a spectator moves from the standard viewing-point. 
Wollheim argues that this perceptual constancy shows that the spectator is not 
merely visually aware of the object depicted but also of the surface properties of the 
picture. Wollheim’s third argument in favor of twofoldness, which is relatively weak 
compared to the other two arguments, is that the twofold experience has a distinctive 
phenomenology: seeing the object in a representation is experientially different from 
seeing the object face-to-face.  
The seeing-in theory gives a detailed account of what the picture viewing 
experience is like; however, I would consider it to be merely a theory that points out 
some of the characteristics of depiction, in Wollheim’s sense, but not a theory that 
explains depiction. What I have in mind here is that this account does not answer the 
core question about depiction: how can objects be seen in a marked surface? Even 
Wollheim himself is pessimistic about the possibility of explaining depiction with 
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the seeing-in theory. He writes “Seeing-in is triggered off by the presence within the 
field of vision of a differentiated surface. Not all differentiated surfaces will have 
this effect, but I doubt that anything significant can be said about exactly what a 
surface must be like for it to have this effect” (Wollheim 1987, 46). In other words, 
although it can be observed that something like ‘seeing-in’ happens, the conditions 
under which this phenomenon does and does not occur have yet to be outlined. 
 
The Make-believe Theory 
Although Wollheim’s seeing-in theory does not explain depiction, some 
theories, like Hopkins’s experienced resemblance theory and Kendall Walton’s 
theory of make-believe, adopt the seeing-in theory to account for the distinctive 
experience of depiction. According to Walton, pictures are props in visual games of 
make-believe. Nearly everyone has engaged in games of make-believe during their 
childhood. Children riding on a plain stick may imagine that they are actually riding 
on horses; or children engaging in the ‘family members pretending game’ may 
imagine a mud pie as a real pie. Of course the stick is not a real horse and the mud 
pie is not a real pie, but they are make-believedly, or in other words, it is imaginarily 
true that there is a horse and a pie. The stick and the mud pie are the props in games 
of make-believe that help players in the game participate physically and 
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psychologically. Similar to the functions of the stick and the mud pie, pictures are 
props in visual games of make-believe. When we are viewing a picture of a ship at 
sea, we imagine, of our perceiving of the marks on the surface that it is a perceiving 
of a ship at sea. One observes the connection between the marks and the depicted 
object. We do not actually see the sea at sea, but we fictionally do so. 
Just like all kinds of games, games of make-believe are governed by game rules. 
Imagining mud pies as real pies, children fictionally eat pies by pretending to bite 
pies. They do not actually bite into pies. This is because in the game, pretending to 
bite pies is fictionally identical to biting pies. If you really bite the pie, the children 
may complain about what you do because in such a game, really biting pies is 
against the rules. Similarly, visual games of make-believe are also governed by 
game rules, or what Walton calls ‘principles of generation’. These principles are 
internalized in our perceptual capacity (Walton 1990, 302). Rejecting Goodman’s 
strong claim that depiction is governed by conventional rules, Walton writes, “Are 
the principles [of generation] biologically grounded, as Wollheim thinks the capacity 
for picture perception is, or cultural artifacts, as Goodman contends? I am sure they 
are some of both. The proportions do not matter” (Walton 1990, 301-2). 
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The Recognition Theory 
The recognition theory of depiction was proposed by Flint Schier. The 
recognition theory is based on the thesis that human beings possess a universal 
recognitional capacity. We recognize the object in a picture by employing the same 
recognitional capacity that we would use to recognize the object in person. Schier 
defines recognition in terms of interpretation: one recognizes an object if one 
visually interprets it as such by employing the recognitional capacity. A picture 
represents an object if the picture triggers the visual interpretation of the object in 
the viewer. Lopes adopts the recognition theory and develops it into the aspect 
recognition theory. In the next chapter I turn to Lopes’s account in detail.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE ASPECT-RECOGNITION THEORY 
 
This chapter mainly introduces Lopes’s theory of depiction—the 
aspect-recognition theory. The account is a kind of hybrid theory of depiction, as it 
has both a symbolic and perceptual nature. In what follows, I will lay out Lopes’s 
formulation in detail based on his book Understanding Pictures (1996).3 
 
Pictorial Reference 
 Adopting a denotative symbol system—a system in which symbols represent 
by denoting, or referring to entities—as the core of a theory of depiction, Lopes 
surveys different theories of pictorial reference to answer the question how pictorial 
symbols refer. He first rejects Goodman’s anti-perceptualism, which is the idea that 
pictorial reference does not depend on the content of the picture, his reason being 
that the descriptive theory of naming is inconsistent with Goodman’s account. In 
addition, a genetic or causal account of reference proposed by Saul Kripke (1980) is 
proven insufficient to determine the denotation of pictorial reference. Lopes then 
introduces his own account of pictorial reference founded on Gareth Evans’s theory 
 
3 In this chapter, pages numbers refer to Understanding Pictures unless specifically 
noted. 
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of information-based identification (Evans 1982). Accordingly, an adequate 
understanding and assessment of Lopes’s claims about depiction requires some 
reference to Evans’s ideas about information. 
 According to Evans, information states, which are the mechanisms for 
information transmission and the storage of information systems, are usually 
associated with “the sub-personal level of the brain, neural processes, and 
psychological mechanism” (102). In addition, information states are 
‘belif-independent’ and ‘non-conceptual’. The contents of information states are not 
affected by beliefs and desires. In a Ponzo’s illusion, we still perceive the top line as 
longer than the bottom line even when we know that they are actually the same 
length; hence information states are belief-independent. With regard to their 
‘non-conceptual’ status, the contents of information systems could consist of 
properties of which the subject does not have concepts. Using Lopes’s example, “in 
order to see and respond to a spectrum of colour, one need not have a concept of 
every visible colour” (103). 
Moreover, a piece of information is “of” the source of that information, which 
is the input of the information system. The reliable transmission of information 
results in a reliable information system, in which the content of an information state 
matches the properties of its source; contrarily, an unreliable information system, 
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because of unreliable transmission, may lead to distorted information. A paradigm of 
an information system that Lopes mentions is a mechanism like a camera. A 
photograph, which is a piece of information, is “of” whatever object reflects the 
light to the film: in other words, object is the source of the information. The 
resulting image may not be an accurate representation of its subject, since accuracy 
depends on the reliability of the system, which in the example refers to the 
mechanism of the camera.  
 
Information-based identification 
When someone possesses a piece of information, he can identify the source of 
the information in two ways: by identifying the source 1) as whatever was actually 
the causal origin or source of the information, and 2) on the basis of its content. 
Identifying the source as whatever was its actual source does not depend on either 
the content or the reliability of the system; one can trace the source by knowing the 
causal history of the information. However, this method of identification requires “a 
sophisticated conception of the information system and of what counts as a source” 
(104). On the other hand, identifying the source by the content of the information 
depends on the reliability of the system. We adopt different ‘modes of identification’ 
towards different kinds of content of informational states. 
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Constraints on thought 
According to Evans, while the information system and accompanying processes 
of identification function at a sub-personal level, “much of the importance…of 
information-based modes of identifying objects lies in their making available certain 
ways of thinking about and hence referring to them” (105). The thoughts about 
objects that enable us to identify these objects as the source of information, and this 
by means of uptake of a particular kind of content are called ‘information-based 
thoughts’. As this is a somewhat obscure way of putting things, resource to 
examples is important. One example mentioned by Lopes is that we think of an 
object by having perceptual contact with it. Such a thought is information-based 
thought, since the content of the thought originates from the perceptual information 
system. Information-based thoughts are confined to two constraints—‘Russell’s 
principle’ and the ‘generality constraint’. Russell’s principle refers to the idea that in 
order to think of an object, one must possess the concept of the object that 
distinguishes the object from all other objects. Elaborating on Russell’s principle, we 
derive the generality constraint that in order to have the thought that ‘a is F’, one 
must have a concept which enables one to understand thoughts like ‘a is G’, ‘a is H’, 
and so on for all the properties that one has a concept of; likewise, for having the 
thought ‘a is F’, one must have a concept which enables one to understand the 
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thoughts ‘b is F’, ‘c is F’, and so on for every object one has a concept of. Therefore, 
the capacity of having a concept of an object is constructed by understanding the 
commonalities between all the thoughts about the object. It is worth mentioning that 
these two constraints only apply to source identification based on the content of the 
information. Identification of the source as whatever was the actual source, this is, 
by understanding the causal history, is not subject to these constraints. 
As I have mentioned, to trace the source of a piece of information with a 
particular kind of content, one has to adopt an appropriate ‘mode of identification’. 
The ‘demonstrative mode’ is one paradigmatic case that satisfies the constraints on 
thought. In Lopes’s words: 
Demonstrative identification requires that the perceiver maintain a perceptual 
connection with an object which provides information about it over a period of 
time. (106) 
In addition,  
 [D]emonstrative identification enables a perceiver to think of an object as 
occupying a unique path in space and time. To understand a demonstrative 
expression is to think of its referent on the basis of an ongoing perceptual link 
with it that meets Evans’s two constraints on thought. (106) 
Lopes takes Evans’s idea of perceptual demonstratives as a suitable model for 
pictorial reference. Pictures are part of an information system. Every picture, as a 
piece of information, carries perceptual information of its subject. A picture depicts 
its subject, as the source of the information, only if the perceiver identifies the 
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subject by employing a particular mode(s) of identification with the information 
provided by the picture. This account of depiction is a hybrid theory in the sense that, 
on the one hand, an object is the picture’s subject only if it serves as the source of 
the information in the causal history of the picture; on the other hand, the content of 
the picture is crucial to the identification of the source of the information, which is 
the subject of the picture. That is why the perceptual aspect of depiction is 
compatible with a denotative symbol system. 
 
Pictorial Aspects 
The next question Lopes tries to answer is what makes pictures distinct from 
other forms of representation. Lopes’s answer to the question appeals to a notion that 
is a fundamental component of his aspect-recognition theory—pictorial aspects.  
 The specificity of pictures, which refers to the distinctive features of pictures’ 
content as well as to their design, is their structural selectivity. There are two kinds 
of selectivities relevant to pictures, and Lopes believes that only the second kind is 
essential to pictures. The first kind of selection is derived from the “impracticability 
of determinacy”, which refers to selections made by artists when they determine 
what properties the object is represented as having, or not having, where the rest 
remains non-committal—meaning indeterminate. For example, a painter may choose 
38 
 
to depict a girl as having freckles or as having no freckles. The second kind of 
selectivity is derived from “structural features” of depiction (118). Someone may 
create a picture from points of view that preclude the picture from representing its 
subjects as having or not having certain properties. One can draw a figure whose 
head is blocked by a signboard, so that whether the figure is wearing a hat remains 
indeterminate, and this indeterminacy is caused by the content of the representation. 
Borrowing Ned Block’s terminology, in Lopes’s example, the first kind of 
indeterminacy is ‘inexplicitly non-committal’, and the second kind of indeterminacy 
is ‘explicitly non-committal’, to the question whether the object is represented as 
hatted or not (118). Lopes argues that descriptions, whether verbal or written, are 
never explicitly non-committal as pictures are. Although a description may state that 
it does not go into whether what it represents has or does not have a certain property, 
it is not necessarily being non-committal regarding that property; this is because 
describing something as having one property does not stop it from being described 
as having, or not having, other properties. Quoting Lopes’s example, saying “I have 
no comment about allegations of the mayor’s corruption” can be supplemented with 
“except to say she’s an extortionist”.  Lopes contends that the commitments and 
non-commitments of a picture are what he calls the ‘aspect’ of the subjects 
represented (119). A subject is represented in different aspects when its properties 
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are committally, explicitly non-committally, and inexplicitly non-committally 
represented. 
Some theorists, like Daniel Dennett (1986, 135-136), E. H. Gombrich, and John 
Searle (1980), try to reduce pictorial aspects to visual aspects. Lopes claims that it is 
a mistake to assume that depiction resembles vision, or pictures must represent their 
subjects from a single viewpoint just as vision is from a point of view. Split-style 
pictures, cubist and neo-cubist paintings represent features of their subjects not from 
a single perceptual point of view but rather from two or multiple indeterminate 
viewpoints, “making commitments and explicit non-commitments consistent with 
those made by visual experiences of objects seen from any number of viewpoints” 
(120). Some pictures, especially those that are not in Albertian perspective, are able, 
by means of different combinations of commitments and explicitly 
non-commitments, to achieve pictorial aspects that no normal visual experience 
could achieve. Furthermore, impossible or paradoxical pictures also distinguish 
pictorial aspects from visual aspects. 
 It is worth noting that pictorial aspects are not only spatial. Explicit 
non-commitments also exist in the form of commitments to texture, colour, and 
other different kinds of properties. Certain combinations of commitments and 
explicit non-commitments of these properties are unique to pictures, hence “the 
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aspects presented by pictures expand on those presented in ordinary visual 
experience. Pictures can represent objects as having combinations of properties that 
the objects could not normally be seen to have” (124). 
According to Lopes, “every picture is explicitly non-committal in some 
respects”. All pictures are selective due to the fact that not all spatial relations of 
their subject, which are in three-dimensional space, can be represented in pictures, 
which is a two-dimensional medium. In order to represent some spatial relations, 
some others would have to be precluded. Therefore representing some of the spatial 
features of a subject in a picture prevents representing others. Pictures are selective 
because artists have to select what spatial features they want to represent, or not to 
represent.  
Is it possible to individuate pictures by the aspects that they represent their 
subjects as having? Take cubist paintings for instance. Such paintings represent their 
subject with fragments from multiple viewpoints. Can we say that a cubist painting 
is actually not one but many pictures? Consider another case of a postcard that is 
divided into four quadrants that show the same scene in four seasons. Are the 
postcard and cubist paintings the same in the sense that they consist of multiple 
pictures? Lopes suggests that what individuates pictures is the ‘spatially unified 
aspect’ of its subject, which is the idea that “every part of the scene that a picture 
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shows must be represented as standing in certain spatial relations to every other 
part” (126). These spatial relations are different for pictures depending on what 
relations are chosen. In cubist paintings, although subjects are represented from 
multiple viewpoints, each part represented from a different viewpoint nevertheless 
relates to every other part. However, in the case of the postcard, each quadrant 
represents different seasons of the same scene, but the objects represented do not 
spatially relate to each other pictorially. To defend the claim Lopes asserts that, 
“being in the same place” is not a spatial relation that suffices for being a 
commitment for a unified picture. Therefore the case of the postcard consists of four 
pictures rather than one. 
Lopes concludes by defining pictures as 
i. representations that present spatially unified aspects of objects, presenting 
objects and parts of objects as related to each other spatially. 
ii. Essentially selective. Since a picture cannot be committal regarding all its 
subject’s spatial properties, commitments it makes to some spatial 
properties entail explicit non-commitment about others. (127) 
Lopes contends that the diversity of pictorial systems can be explained by different 
kinds of spatial aspects resulting from combinations of different commitments.  
 
Pictorial Systems 
Lopes contends that there are quite a number of theories that attempt to set 
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forth what distinguishes pictorial representation from other kinds of representations. 
He claims, however, that no theorist has answered the question about what 
distinguishes pictorial systems from each other. He proposes that the answer to the 
question can appeal to different combinations of commitments and explicit 
non-commitment of different types of properties. ‘Pictorial systems’, the term 
proposed by Goodman, is a concept similar to language systems. In Lopes’s words, 
“a system of depiction, in the abstract, is the set of all pictures that could be made by 
combining pictorial referents with pictorial predicates” (128). If two pictures share 
the same commitments and non-commitments regarding all the same types of 
properties, then they are in the same pictorial system; on the contrary, if two pictures 
are committal and non-committal with regard to different types of properties, they 
are in different pictorial systems. 
Nevertheless, unlike linguistic systems, the representational content of pictorial 
systems is not boundless since pictorial content is aspectually constructed, which 
means that in order to make commitments about some properties, one must be 
non-committal about other properties. This constrains the “allowable combinations 
of predicates”; therefore pictorial content is limited rather than boundless. 
So far, pictorial systems have been likened to linguistic systems in different 
ways. One may wonder whether pictorial systems are conventional in the same way 
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linguistic systems are. Lopes claims that a system-relative account of depiction is 
not necessarily connected to the kind of anti-perceptualism that Goodman defends, 
which is the idea that since depiction is not confined to perceptual mechanisms, 
anything may represent anything else. Moreover, a conventional account of 
depiction is incompatible with aspectually structured pictorial systems. 
 Lopes introduces David Lewis’s conception of conventionality (Lewis 1975) 
that is based on the idea that conventions are solutions to coordination problems. 
According to Lewis, something x’s being conventional implies that there are other 
alternatives that are just as good as x. In other words, preference for any equally 
viable solution is arbitrary (in the sense that it is conditional on the preferences of 
others in the group). Language is conventional because there are many equally good 
languages that could in principle serve the coordinative functions of the language. 
However, Lopes contends that aspects of different systems of depiction are 
sometimes preferable to others in some contexts. Aspectual differences do matter for 
‘compositional’ reasons and ‘representational’ reasons (Lopes 1996, 134). The 
former is about “preference given to certain kinds of marks, shapes, patterns, colours, 
or textures on the picture surface”. For example, Kwakiutl split-style is preferable 
for symmetry composition, and fitting pictures onto surfaces of predetermined 
shapes; axonometric projection is preferable for scroll painting since it allows 
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infinite horizontal or vertical extension of scenes without distortion. Aspectual 
differences matter to representational reasons because pictures are made according 
to what aspects of the world we would like to show. For example, Albertian painting 
aims at mimicking visual experience by complying with the perspective projection. 
Therefore, the choices of pictorial systems are not arbitrary since every system 
adopts different characteristic aspects for different purposes. As a result, pictorial 
systems are not equally good alternatives, hence they are not conventional, at least 
in Lewis’s sense. 
 
Pictorial Recognition 
In spite of the aspectual construction of pictures, recognition is another 
important notion in Lopes’s theory of depiction. As Lopes has shown, pictures are 
aspectually structured, resulting in a diversity of pictorial systems. He argues that 
human beings have an ability, which he calls ‘pictorial competence’, such that once 
we understand a picture of a certain pictorial system, we understand other instances 
in that system but not necessarily pictures in other systems. Lopes contends that a 
recognition theory, which is the basis of Lopes’s theory of depiction, is able to 
explain the diversity of pictures and their aspectual structures, as well as the 
limitation of our pictorial competence. There are three forms of recognition—feature 
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recognition, individual recognition, and kind recognition. Feature and kind 
recognition can happen without individual recognition—one could recognize what 
kind of dog one meets without knowing whether it is the particular dog that one had 
met before. And Lopes’s focus is on individual recognition, which is also known as 
particular recognition. 
 This kind of recognitional ability that human beings possess is dynamic, and is 
an ability that “link[s] currently perceived objects with objects perceived in the past 
despite what may amount to radical changes in appearance” (139). Facial 
recognition is especially dynamic. We are able to recognize faces of our relatives, 
whom we haven’t met for many years, in spite of changes in appearance due to 
aging. According to Lopes, saying recognition is dynamic means the particular can 
be recognized under different aspects. An object with a set of visual properties can 
be recognized although it had another set of visual properties that we have once seen. 
However, the recognition dynamism has its limits. First, the elasticity of recognition 
is not boundless. Objects may change, with extreme distortions for example, beyond 
recognition when the changes “overstretch” the dynamic recognition capacity. 
Second, “recognition abilities are always dynamic relative to kinds of aspects”. 
Recognition fails when a familiar object’s changes lay in other aspects in relation to 
which recognition is not dynamic. We may recognize our relatives even though they 
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are aged, but we may fail to recognize them in distorting mirrors. Therefore the 
dynamic recognition ability is aspectually bounded. Lopes calls “the kinds of aspects 
with respect to which objects can vary but remain recognizable ‘dimensions of 
variation’” (139). 
Dynamism of recognition varies in degree with the number of dimensions over 
which recognition is still viable. And recognition reaches its limit when the object is 
not recognized across a new dimension of variation. Not only does aspectual 
structure affect the boundaries of recognitional dimension of variation, but the 
amount and type of information gathered from the object required for recognition 
vary from one dimension to another. One can imagine that recognizing an aged face 
may require information accumulated from several encounters, while recognition of 
a face from a slightly different angle requires information obtained from just a 
glance. These characteristics of the recognitional dynamic abilities explain the 
generativity of such ability. The generativity of the recognitional ability refers to the 
thesis that recognizing an object under a new kind of aspect is necessarily sufficient 
for recognizing other objects under the same kind of aspect. With such generativity, 
Lopes claims that being able to recognize an object seen from a new viewpoint must 
suffice “for being able to recognize other subjects transformed in similar ways”. The 
same idea applies to aging as well: when one is able to recognize the aged face of 
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one’s relative, one is able to recognize other faces after aging.  
Since Lopes adopts Evans’s structure of thoughts, he has to examine whether 
the recognition-based thoughts can satisfy the two constraints—the ‘Russell’s 
principle’ and the ‘generality constraint’.  
 If someone is to recognize his/her relative, he or she has to distinguish this 
relative from all other people. The discriminating characteristic of recognition-based 
thoughts meets Russell’s principle. Moreover, the dynamism and generativity of 
recognition assure recognition-based thoughts satisfy the generality constraint. The 
example provided by Lopes is a dimension of variation which consists of 
upside-down aspects of objects, with the generativity of recognition, if one is able to 
judge the thought that an object is upside-down, one is also able to judge thoughts 
that all other objects are upside-down within that dimension; similarly, by dynamism 
of recognition, if one is able to have a thought of an object seen in one aspect, one is 
able to recognize that object seen under other aspects, within the limit of one’s 
recognition capacity. Therefore, the generativity and dynamism of recognition 
ensure recognition-based thoughts satisfy the generality constraint. It is worth noting 
that since information states are belief-independent and non-conceptual, aspectual 
information, which pertains to the aspectual information system, is also 
belief-independent and non-conceptual. This means that even though the perceiver 
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possesses concepts of the subjects in a picture that is shown in a particular aspect, he 
does not necessarily have the concept of that aspect. For example, someone 
necessarily possesses the concept of Big Ben in order to recognize Big Ben in a 
picture in Albertian style; however, it is not necessary to have the concept of the 
Albertian style.  
One may ask what the mechanism of recognition is. A number of theorists, H. 
H. Price for example, reduce recognition to descriptive identification. Descriptive 
identification is the idea that recognizing an object requires one to identify 
characteristics of that object which can lead us to recall an earlier instance that 
shares the same characteristics. These characteristics are called the ‘identifying 
features’. However, according to Lopes, recognition is different from ‘recall’ in that 
recall is neither necessary nor sufficient for recognition. One the one hand, one 
could recognize someone in the street while not being able to recall when and where 
one previously met that person; or one could misremember that occasion while still 
successfully recognizing who the person is. One the other hand, it is not uncommon 
when someone, J, is in front of us, to be able to recall the previous features of J, 
even though we cannot recognize J as J. We fail to do so because we are not able to 
establish the link between the occurrent perceptual information and the past 
encounters. Lopes concludes that recognition is not descriptive since recall of 
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identifying features is neither sufficient nor necessary to recognition.  
Lopes claims that because they depend on our ability of identification, pictures 
are ‘visual prostheses’ that “extend information systems by gathering, storing, and 
transmitting visual information about their subjects” (144). Pictorial recognition 
differs from ordinary visual recognition by having two levels of 
recognition—‘content recognition’ and ‘subject recognition’. Since a picture is a 
two-dimensional surface covered with marks, colours, and different kinds of visual 
properties, on viewing a picture, one has to recognize “the design as the features 
making up an aspect of its subject.” This level of recognition is called 
‘content-recognition’. By recognizing the features that make up the aspect of the 
subject, we recognize the pictorial content as its subject in a certain aspect. This is 
‘subject recognition’. Someone may have content recognition but fail to have 
subject-recognition if he cannot recognize what the features are an aspect of. For 
example, someone may fail to recognize a portrait of Nixon even though he 
recognizes all the visible facial properties that Nixon possesses as represented by 
pictorial content. He may identify a man with all the properties, which are the 
properties of Nixon, that are represented in the picture, but he cannot recognize the 
man represented as Nixon since he does not have concepts about Nixon or the 
thought that the man with such properties is Nixon. In addition, Lopes rejects the 
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idea that subject-recognition comes always after content-recognition since subject 
recognition may change the representational relevance of the design features. So 
“content-recognition can be informed by simultaneous subject-recognition” (145). 
After explaining how a picture depicts in terms of recognitional identification, 
Lopes argues that the resemblance experienced between the picture and the object 
can be explained by content recognition and subject recognition. The 
representationally relevant resemblance is indeed recognition-dependent 
resemblance—the experienced resemblance between the properties the object is 
depicted as having and the properties of the object is dependent on one’s 
interpretation during the recognitional processes. Using the duck-rabbit picture as an 
example, our experienced resemblance between the design and the object varies 
when we see the design differently as a duck or a rabbit. When we see the design as 
a rabbit, the left part resembles long ears; however, when we view it as a duck, it 
resembles a bill. Therefore, the experienced resemblance is recognition-dependent. 
Since pictures are aspectually structured, recognition-dependent resemblance is also 
aspect dependent; it varies with different systems of depiction.  
Lopes distinguishes two kinds of depiction—‘basic portrayal’ and ‘basic 
depiction’—by the nature of their sources. Lopes contends that pictures represent by 
embodying information that allows perceivers to recognize the object in a certain 
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aspect. If the source of the information embodied in a picture is a particular object, 
then the picture ‘portrays’ the object; this kind of picturing is called ‘basic portrayal’. 
For example, we may see a photo of Bill Clinton in a newspaper. By the properties 
that we recognize in the information, we recognize that the man with the features is 
Clinton. However, the source is not always recognized. One recognizes a woman 
with certain features in the Mona Lisa, however, one may or may not be able to 
know who the woman is. In other words, one does not sufficiently recognize the 
woman depicted by merely looking at the painting. In another example, in the 
duck/rabbit picture, we recognize there is a duck/rabbit, however, the duck/rabbit is 
a depiction of the kind, which is the duck/rabbit kind, but not of a particular 
duck/rabbit. This kind of picturing is called ‘basic depiction’.  
 Both basic portrayal and basic depiction require the perceiver to be a ‘suitable 
perceiver’. According to Lopes, a suitable perceiver is someone who possesses a 
“suitably dynamic recognition ability” (152) in both levels of content recognition 
and subject recognition. In spite of recognizing the content of a picture, which is the 
general requirement, for a picture depicting x in y aspect, suitable perceivers 
1. are those familiar with the subject and who possesses recognitional capacity for 
the subject; 
2. should have the competence to recognize other subjects which one is familiar 
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with under y. 
However, it is not uncommon that suitable perceivers of a picture no longer exist. 
This is the case especially for paintings with a long history. Lopes argues that 
recognitional ability need not be derived from direct acquaintance with the subject; 
one may derive the ability from people who had direct acquaintance. Therefore the 
ability may be passed down from person to person over a long period of time. 
Furthermore, it is possible for perceivers to identify the source of the object by 
applying the recognition ability of the same object one derived from other pictures. 
For example, one may apply the recognition ability of Wellington derived from a 
banknote to a painting of Wellington and successfully identify Wellington. In 
addition, some pictures cannot be recognized although viewers know that the 
pictures have sources. Lopes suggests those pictures should be treated in the same 
way as we treat fictions (154-155).  
 
Pictorial Meaning 
Lopes claims that understanding what a picture represents by means of 
recognizing the subject is “to entertain a thought which links the visual information 
presented by the picture with a body of stored information from its subject” (158). 
Pictures represent in various ways. A picture may be used to represent the ground of 
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a building in a model; however, in this example, the picture does not represent as a 
picture. When a picture represents as a picture, the representational content is the 
‘pictorial sense’; hence “a theory of depiction is a theory of pictorial sense”. 
Understanding the pictorial sense of a picture qua picture requires one first to 
identify the subject of the picture. Basic picturing, which includes basic portrayal 
and basic depiction, is one of the ways to grasp the pictorial meaning of a picture. 
Hence for a picture to depict x, x must be able to be recognized by a suitable 
perceiver who understands the picture as a picture qua picture. Reading an excellent 
an informative description of a picture’s content, and thereby knowing what the 
picture is a picture of, is not a case of understanding that picture’s pictorial sense. 
With regard to the relation between pictorial sense and the picture-maker’s 
intentions, Lopes adopts an anti-intentionalist line. Lopes maintains that what the 
artist intended to do is not always what the artist has actually done. There is possibly 
a gap between “what I intended to depict and what I in fact depicted” (159). The 
intentions of the artist are neither necessary nor sufficient for fixing the meaning of 
the works. Lopes draws a distinction between ‘pictorial’ intention and 
‘communicative’ intention. The former refers to the intention to produce a picture 
embedded with information that is identifiable by a suitable perceiver; the latter 
refers to the general intention to represent “something”. Pictorial intention is 
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involved in pictorial representation, while communicative intention can be involved 
in representations other than pictorial representation.  
Lopes introduces two puzzles to see whether they can be resolved by his theory 
of depiction. The first problem is that recognition ability fails when we are unable to 
distinguish indiscernible objects. Pictures, as a result, fail to “portray” objects that 
have indiscernible counterparts since we do not possess recognitional abilities 
towards these objects. The second problem is that some pictures present their 
subjects in unusual aspects that are unrecognizable by normal perceivers. This kind 
of “malfunction in the information system” may happen in a way that the subject of 
the picture is represented as a totally different object. This happens commonly when 
models are used for the artists to represent something else. The example Lopes gives 
is that Rembrandt used Hendrickje Stoffels as the model for a picture of Bathsheba. 
Although the person depicted in the picture can be recognized as Hendrickje, many 
people would disagree that the picture is of Hendrickje. These problems reveal that 
tracing the source of the subject of a picture solely by its content is inadequate.  
 In order to solve these puzzles, Lopes introduces a distinction between primary 
sources and secondary sources. A primary source is an object or a kind of object 
serving in the genesis of a picture, and it does not depend on the “nature of other 
information from any other source” (Lopes 1996, 164). Similarly, a secondary 
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source is an object or a kind of object serving in the genesis of a picture, and it 
depends on the nature of information that derived from the primary source of the 
picture. For example, in the case of Rembrandt’s Bathsheba, Bathsheba is the 
primary source and Hendrickje is the secondary source because Hendrickje served 
as the model for Bathsheba due to her putative resemblance to Bathsheba. In other 
words, Rembrandt made use of the features of Hendrickje, which is crucial to 
represent Bathsheba, to represent Bathsheba. In Lopes’s words, “Bathsheba is 
primarily of Bathsheba and secondarily of Hendrickje, because Hendrickje’s serving 
as a model depended on a resemblance to Bathsheba that made her a suitable conduit 
for information from Bathsheba” (164). 
 In the last section, Lopes distinguishes between pictorial intentions and 
communicative intentions. Pictorial intentions may not be fulfilled because of failure 
of recognition due to poor artistry. However, even when pictorial intention fails, the 
communicative intention can be known in other ways, for example, by means of 
testimony given by the painter. A picture may fail to depict its subject pictorially, but 
we can understand the meaning of the picture by understanding the communicative 
intention of the artist.  
Like basic picturing, information-based pictorial description and conventional 
iconographic pictures are pictorial modes of identification. Unlike a purely 
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descriptive picture, which represents its subject as what its content represents, 
pictorial description depicts by possessing information that can be identified by 
viewers who derived the information from sources other than the picture. It is 
necessary to have a well-grounded identification in order to identify what is 
represented as the source of the picture. It is this well-groundedness, rather than the 
accuracy of the content to the source, that distinguishes pictorial description from 
purely descriptive pictures. Pictorial description is applied frequently to historical 
subjects and places. Another kind of identification mode Lopes introduces is 
iconographic pictures. Both descriptive pictures and iconographic pictures depict 
objects that we can no longer recognize, like historical figures. However, the subject 
of an iconographic picture is not bounded by the properties that the picture 
represents it as having. The same subject can be represented in different ways. For 
example, St. Jerome is depicted with various features. We recognize St. Jerome not 
by the attributed features but the ‘emblems’ that are depicted along with St. Jerome. 
These emblems including a representation of an old man, “a priest, a cardinal, a 
monk writing, a penitent in the desert, with a lion nearby, a model of a church…” 
(169) and so on. With the presence of these emblems, we realize a picture depicts St. 
Jerome no matter what different facial features he is represented as having. The 
emblems, hence the iconographic pictures, are based on convention. According to 
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Lopes, “a representation depicts an object iconographically in a community of 
picture-users if it has a content ψ and there is a convention such that ψ-pictures 
represent that object” (171). 
 
Pictorial Experience 
According to Lopes, an adequate theory of depiction should be able to explain 
four constraints—the diversity constraint, the competence constraint, the 
phenomenology constraint, and the twofoldness constraint. The first two have been 
introduced and discussed above; the latter two, which both pertain to pictorial 
experience, will be explained now. According to Lopes, the aspect-recognition 
theory of depiction has three advantages in explaining pictorial experience. First, by 
not building the theory of depiction upon pictorial experience, the verity of pictorial 
experience is not limited by our affinity to ordinary visual experience. Hence, 
aspect-recognition theory accommodates the pictorial experience of seeing a 
landscape picture in reverse colour, or seeing a man in a cubist painting. Second, 
aspect-recognition theory acknowledges that pictorial experience is aspectual. 
Unlike most perceptual theories that have no such acknowledgement, aspect 
recognition theory claims that the pictorial experience of an object is an experience 
of the object in a pictorial aspect, rather than the experience of the object tout court. 
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Third, aspect-recognition theory accommodates the idea of the spectrum of 
twofoldness. Lopes claims that pictorial experience need not be twofold. The 
spectrum of twofoldness, with twofold experience in one pole and illusionism at the 
other extreme, allows pictorial experiences to be twofold or merely object-directed. 
With what he refers to as ‘the three advantages’ in mind, Lopes tries to answer 
the question how one has a visual experience of the object represented in a picture 
when viewing the picture by appealing to Kendall Walton’s idea of seeing-through. 
Walton holds that while only photographs are transparent, meaning we literally see 
the objects in a photograph, we make-believedly see the objects of other pictures. 
However, Lopes argues that transparency is indeed the key for explaining pictorial 
experience of all kinds of pictures; all pictures share the transparent nature. He does 
so by arguing that pictures are also belief-independent and non-conceptual. 
According to Lopes, an information system is a system of non-deviant causal 
chains. If picturing is an information system, a picture is caused by its source, which 
is the input, and is caused in typical but not in deviant ways. As mentioned earlier, 
informational states are belief-independent, therefore pictures are also 
belief-independent in two ways. First, the subject of a picture is the source of what it 
represents, the subject of a picture is no more determined by artist’s intention than 
that of photographs. Hence, just like photographs, pictures are belief-independent. 
59 
 
Second, drawing a picture is belief independent since “drawing is simply applied 
recognition. In order to draw, you are required only to make marks that are 
recognizably of the object whose appearance is guiding your drawing movements” 
(Lopes 1996, 184). Since recognition is belief-independent, drawing, which is 
simply the application of recognition, is independent as well.  
 In spite of its belief-independent nature, Lopes claims that drawing is also 
‘non-conceptual’. Recalling the example of seeing a colour spectrum, concepts of 
the colours, like the wavelengths of light, are not necessary for seeing the colour. 
Similarly, the content of experience of design features is non-conceptual. One may 
compare two polygons and conclude that they are different without knowing that 
one is a 998-sided polygon and the other one is a 1000-sided polygon. If experience 
of design features is non-conceptual, how about the experience of pictorial content? 
Similar to his argument of the belief-independent nature of drawing, Lopes holds 
that “to draw is simply to be guided by the appearance of an object in making a 
surface which will present an aspect that is recognizable as of that object” (186). 
Lopes’s claim here is obviously a strong and controversial one. He comments: 
I see no reason why an artist must bring to bear any concepts about the content 
of a picture he is making. It is possible to draw something, guided by the look 
of the thing, and to produce a recognizable aspect of it, without having a 
concept of it. (ibid) 
Since a concept of x is necessary for having a belief of x, if drawing is 
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ng on Alvin Goldman’s and Fred Dretske’s proposal regarding visual 
mod
                                                
non-conceptual, as Lopes claims, then drawing can be belief-independent.  
Despite arguing for the possible belief-independent nature of pictures, Lopes 
also rejects Walton’s claim that ‘real similarity relations’ suffice for transparency. 
Everything is similar to everything else in some respects. It is unclear how to 
separate the similarities that are ‘real’ from others. However, Lopes contends, the 
account of transparency does not really appeal to the “reality of real similarity”, but 
to the notion of ‘second-order isomorphism’. He claims that the similarity in 
Walton’s claim is a ‘second-order correspondence’ between the design properties 
and the properties the object is represented as having. This kind of correspondence, 
in the usage of cognitive science, is called a ‘second-order isomorphism’4 (188). The 
problem is that second-order isomorphism is not unique to pictorial transparency, 
since “any analogue measure, by definition, preserves some second-order 
isomorphism with properties of what it measures” (189). Even worse, non-analogue 
representations also preserve second-order isomorphism. Therefore, second-order 
isomorphism is not sufficient to transparency, and it cannot explain depiction. 
Drawi
ality (190-191), Lopes tries to explain the characteristic experience of visual 
perception—pictorial transparency. Pictures use design properties, which are visual, 
 
4 For more details and references to the ‘second-order isomorphism’, see Lopes’s 
footnote on p. 188. 
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Fictive Pictures 
In spite the possibility of mi ty of fictive pictures is 
anot
to visually represent objects with visual properties. Lopes holds that the general 
principle of transparency should be explained in terms of perceptual modality: 
“transparent media are those whose design properties are perceivable through the 
same sense modality as are the properties comprising their content” (Lopes 1996, 
190). One example he gives is voice. “A voice on a radio is transparent in part 
because radios represent voices aurally and voices are normally perceived aurally” 
(ibid). Under the notions of modality and transparency, Lopes contends that pictorial 
experience is indeed twofold: in one fold, the design properties convey visual 
information; on the other fold, the object represented conveys visual information of 
its properties. Therefore, Lopes argues, pictures are a visual prosthesis as they 
represent the visual world by visual properties in different aspects that could not 
been seen under ordinary vision.  
 
srepresentation, the possibili
her issue that a theory of depiction should accommodate. A fictive picture is real 
picture of which the content, or the objects represented do not exist. Fictive pictures 
are problematic for objective resemblance theory because fictive pictures represent 
imaginary objects. If the represented object is imaginary, there is no referent of the 
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 order to say how fictive pictures refer 
and 
objective resemblance; hence resemblance is hardly applicable to the object 
represented. Fictive pictures raise other problems that are not only problematic to 
the objective resemblance theory, but to all theories of depiction: objects represented 
with different properties may indeed be representations of the same imaginary 
subject. What does it mean when we say that pictures may depict the same fictive 
subject? Lopes answers this question by appealing to ‘Moore’s constraint’: “two 
pictures represent the same fictional object if and only if, were the object to exist, 
both would represent the same object” (198). Therefore if two pictures with different 
content are indeed representing the same subject, there should be some relations 
between them explaining the shared subject.  
Lopes appeals to the notion of pretense in
how such reference mimics, and is parasitic upon, actual reference. Fictive 
reference is derived by pretending that there is actual reference. Lopes adopts 
Walton’s theory of make-believe to explain the notion of pretense. According to 
Walton’s theory, one participates in a game of make-believe when one imagines 
some non-existent states of affairs is the case with props of the games under certain 
‘game rules’. For example, when one is viewing the painting Piazza San Marco, the 
painting is a prop for one to imagine that one is actually seeing Piazza San Marco. 
The notation of this example is “*see Piazza San Marco*(MB)” (202), which means 
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ognizes the object represented 
ed as of a different 
at has a source is identified as of no source; 
nd 
t fails to “elicit” 
that it is make-believedly true that one sees the Piazza San Marco. It is worth noting 
that the aspect-recognition theory need not draw upon Walton’s notion of 
make-believe to explain depiction, since according to the aspect-recognition theory, 
one simply recognizes the piazza in the painting by virtue of the information of the 
painting which was derived from its subject. The aspect-recognition theory need not 
use the notion of make-believe to explain our seeing of the piazza because what the 
picture depicts has a source and, therefore, the reference to the source is established. 
However, in the case of a fictive picture, the information conveyed by the picture 
does not have a source, so the reference of the information to the source cannot be 
established. Therefore Lopes proposes that “make-believe may explain only fictive 
pictures, as it may explain only fictive words” (202). 
 As mentioned earlier, the viewer of a picture rec
by identifying the visual information of the picture derived from the source. 
However, such identification can be ‘ill-grounded’ in four cases: 
1. a picture embodies information from a source that is identifi
source;  
1. a picture th
2. a picture that has no source is identified as of a source; a
3. a picture embodies information from no source tha
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fictive pictures fall into the fourth kind of ill-grounded 
identification. 
Lopes claims that 
identification. Fictive pictures do not actually have any source, and viewers of 
fictive pictures fail to identify the pictures as of anything. Thus the notion of 
make-believe is necessary to explain the imaginary source and identification: a 
picture *has a source*(MB) and is *identifiable as of the source*(MB). The 
identification of *source*(MB) is made possible by the application of our 
recognition ability for fictive objects. We acquire such abilities in a manner that is 
“largely parallels” to how we acquire recognition ability for existent objects: by 
verbal testimony about fictive objects, and sometimes such abilities originate from 
fictive pictures as well. One may *recognize yeti*(MB) in a picture by one’s 
previous *recognition of yeti*(MB) in another picture. In addition, Lopes claims 
that “pictures and stories must be responsible for initiating abilities to 
*identify*(MB) fictional objects” (206). Again, Lopes holds an anti-intentionalist 
view: the intentions of artists do not contribute to the fictive status of a picture; an 
artist may paint a picture of yeti while believing that yeti really exist, so he paints 
the picture without merely pretending that the source of the information exists. 
However, the viewers of the picture may understand the picture as a fictive picture, 
and engage in a pretence that the source of the information exists. Lopes concludes 
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f Lopes’s aspect-recognition theory will be 
that “the meaning of pictures, including fictive ones, is independent of the artist’s, or 
anybody else’s, beliefs. Pictures’ status as perceptual mechanisms is the foundation 
of their function as fictions” (208).  
 Various published criticisms o
summarized in chapter five, and my own critical remarks about this theory will be 
introduced in chapter seven. Before going into the criticisms, let us take a detailed 
look at Robert Hopkins’s experienced resemblance theory in outline shape. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
EXPERIENCED RESEMBLANCE THEORY IN OUTLINE SHAPE 
 
The Six Explananda 
Robert Hopkins set forth his theory of depiction in his book Pictures, Image 
and Experience5. Before he presents the details of his theory, he first outlines six 
‘explananda’ of depiction. Hopkins acknowledges that there are different approaches 
to depiction and he adds that one cannot choose any of them unless one makes clear 
what kind of explanation a theory of depiction should provide. By setting forth the 
explananda, based on agreement over key features of depiction, we can gain a 
sharper sense of the boundary around the phenomenon of depiction. Such an 
approach, he argues, is superior to that of trying to argue over whether individual 
cases count as depictions or not. These explananda are themselves valuable, as 
Hopkins claims, since even if Hopkins’s theory is proven inadequate, philosophers 
can still continue the discussion based on these explananda; or if one finds the 
explananda unsatisfactory, theorists can propose modifications to, or even a new set 
of, explananda before proceeding to a detailed account of depiction. Therefore, 
setting forth the explananda facilitates the discussion of the theory of depiction, and 
 
5 Page numbers in this chapter refer to Pictures, Image and Experience unless 
specifically noted.  
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promises to make it more efficient. 
The first feature of depiction Hopkins mentions is that “(x1) There is a 
significant minimum pictorial content” (27), which distinguishes pictorial 
representation from linguistic representation. A picture may represent a particular 
thing, or some, but no particular, thing. This means that a picture may ascribe 
properties to a particular, or it may ascribe properties to some, but no particular, 
things. When a picture depicts a particular, some properties have to be ascribed to 
that particular; there is no bare depiction of a particular. This contrasts to linguistic 
representation in the sense that a proper name represents a particular without 
ascribing any properties to it. For example, I learn nothing from the term ‘Big Ben’ 
except that it names Big Ben; by contrast, a picture of Big Ben shows me the shape, 
the colour, and even some detailed features of Big Ben, assuming that the picture is 
a true and clear depiction of Big Ben. In addition, this contrast applies to depictions 
of some, but no particular, thing as well. The term ‘horse’ does not ascribe any 
properties to the group of animals while a picture of a horse ascribes at least some, if 
not many, features to these animals. 
This explanandum faces two objections. First, the sentence is the basic unit of 
linguistic meaning. Proper names only represent by “the role they can play in 
sentences” (25). Although proper names do not ascribe properties to their referents, 
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sentences do. Second, as the description theory of language proposes, proper names 
refer to their referents with a set of descriptions that ascribe properties to them. 
Hopkins claims that one can avoid the first objection by abandoning the contrast 
between depiction and linguistic representation. One can only claim that there is no 
bare depiction, and explain this feature by a theory of depiction. However, the 
second objection is more problematic since abandoning the contrast with language 
simply leaves us with the question of how a picture depicts specifically. 
Hopkins replies to the objection by appealing to the Aristotelian notion of 
genus and species. Everything that falls under the species S of a genus G must fall 
under G, but not vice versa. For example, ‘toy poodle’ is a species of poodle, which 
belongs to the genus ‘dog’; therefore ‘toy poodle’ automatically falls under the 
genus of ‘dog’. Furthermore, for a representation to ascribe properties F to an object 
O is to represent O as falling under the class of F-things (26). In Hopkins’s words, 
“the F-class is represented as occupied” (Ibid). However, both language and picture 
represent species as occupied; what distinguishes depiction from linguistic 
representation lies with the concept of ‘base class’. A ‘base class’ is a class “for a 
representation R any class such that R represents something as falling under that 
class, but not by virtue of representing it as falling under some species with respect 
to which that class is genus” (ibid). Pictorial representation differs from linguistic 
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representation in that for any base class represented as occupied by a pictorial 
representation, there is a genus that can be represented as occupied by a linguistic 
representation, but not vice versa. Hopkins gives a detailed formulation as follows: 
(1) For any pictorial representation P and any based class C which it represents 
as occupied, there is a genus G and some (possible) linguistic representation 
D, such that G is a base class for D. 
While in contrast: 
(2) It is not the case that for any linguistic representation D and any base class 
C which it represents as occupied, there is a genus G and a (possible) 
pictorial representation P, such that G is a base class for P (26-27). 
For example, the observer of The School of Athens sees two men in the middle of the 
painting. For the base class—man-class—the painting represented as occupied, we 
have a genus—‘mammal’ and a linguistic representation—‘mammal’, such that 
‘mammal’ is a base class of ‘mammal’. On the contrary, for the linguistic 
representation ‘man’ and the base class—man-class—it represented as occupied, 
there is a genus—‘mammal’—but no pictorial representation, such that ‘mammal’ is 
a base class for the pictorial representation. Hopkins claims that this prevents cases 
like a picture of a dappled horse from representing a mammal, and allows a 
description of a dappled horse to represent nothing more than a dappled horse (27).  
The second feature of depiction discussed by Hopkins is that depiction is 
necessarily perspectival.  
(X2) Everything depicted is depicted from some point of view. (27) 
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Pictures do not always depict from one single point of view. Cubist paintings for 
example, may depict from multiple points of view. Hopkins claims that the pictorial 
perspective is one of the significant features that a theory of depiction should 
explain. 
 The third feature of pictures concerns the visibility of pictures’ subjects and 
objects.  
(X3) Whatever can be depicted can be seen. (ibid)  
By ‘whatever’, Hopkins refers to any particular or property. He contends that any 
particular subject of pictures is visible since pictures only depict visible particulars, 
and the objects represented always have an appearance. In other words, the 
properties ascribed to the object represented are “in general visually detectable” 
(ibid). With the reading above, (X3) precludes the possibility of the depiction of 
non-visible properties.  
A straightforward objection is that pictures sometimes represent things that are 
not visible, for example, the magnetic field. A diagram showing the magnetic field 
of a magnet seems to be a counterexample to the claim that pictures can only 
represent visible subjects, since the subject of the diagram and the object represented, 
the magnetic field, is not visible. Hopkins replies to this counterexample by stating 
that although the diagram is a representation of a magnetic field, it does not 
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represent the field pictorially. Just as a map represents a certain area, the diagram 
represents by other means. 
 The fourth feature concerns the misrepresentation of depiction: 
(X4) Pictorial misrepresentation is possible, but has its limits. (30) 
Pictures may ascribe various properties to the objects represented that are not 
possessed by the subjects. In cases like this, misrepresentation happens because 
depending on painters’ intention and imagination, properties can be boundlessly 
ascribed to the objects represented. However, Hopkins holds that misrepresentation 
has its limits. When an object is represented as deviating too much from its subject, 
the object is no longer a pictorial representation of that subject.  
The fifth and the sixth features concern the epistemic resources needed to 
understand pictures. When one knows how a pictorial style depicts, one is able to 
interpret other instances of that style, and is able to know that those instances depict, 
provided that one has the knowledge of the appearance of the objects depicted. 
Hopkins formulates the condition as follows: 
(X5) General competence with depiction and knowledge of the appearance of 
O (be it a particular a or merely a, but no particular, F-thing) suffice for the 
ability to interpret depiction of O. 
 
(X6) General competence with depiction and knowledge of the appearance of 
O are necessary for the ability to interpret depiction of O (31). 
However, there may be counterexamples to (X5) and (X6). Throughout the history 
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of art, there are many paintings, especially portraits of historical figures, such that 
the viewers, even the painters themselves, do not possess knowledge of the 
appearances of the subjects, yet we still say that the paintings depict the subjects. 
The example used by Hopkins is Simone Martini’s St John the Evangelist. The 
painting depicts St. John even though the painter does not possess any knowledge of 
St John’s appearance. This example challenges (X6) since viewers are able to 
understand the painting, say, by reading the title of the painting, without having any 
knowledge of St John’s appearance. Hence having knowledge of St John’s 
appearance is not necessary to an understanding of the painting; the example also 
challenges (X5) since if one has the knowledge of St John’s appearance, one may 
fail to understand who the painting depicts since the properties ascribed to St John 
by the painting could be different from the properties St John actually had. Hence 
possessing knowledge of St John’s appearance is not sufficient for understanding the 
painting. This example also threatens (X4) as well, for Simone Martini was ignorant 
of St John’s appearance, so the properties he ascribed to St John could be very 
different from the properties that St John really possessed. Nevertheless, we still say 
that the painting depicts St John. This undermines (X4) because misrepresentation 
seems not to have any limits, at least in the sense that quite possibly St John looked 
vastly different from other persons depicted in the painting. 
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 Hopkins contends that the claim “St John the Evangelist depicts St John” is not 
accurate. He agrees that the painting does represent St John, but it represents him in 
a “non-pictorial manner” (33). Since if we accept that St John the Evangelist depicts 
St John, we have to accept that understanding some kinds of picture requires 
resources different from understanding pictures of someone whose appearances we 
know; what is required is only a general competence and knowledge of appearances. 
Thus there are two distinctive kinds of pictorial content, the understanding of which 
requires different epistemic resources. In the case of St John the Evangelist, having 
the knowledge of St John’s appearance is not necessary and sufficient for 
understanding the picture. Extra knowledge, say, derived from reading the title of 
the painting and understanding the historical background, is needed. Yet in many 
ordinary cases an observer can understand a picture with only the general 
competence and knowledge of the subject’s appearance. Hopkins claims that the 
kind of pictorial content exhibited by St John the Evangelist does not cohere with 
the six explananda as a whole, and if someone claims that the painting does 
represent St John pictorially, the burden of proof falls on him or her (35). 
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Experienced Resemblance Theory 
 At the end of chapter two, Hopkins raises three problems that a revised 
resemblance theory should overcome in order to be workable (49). The first one is 
that the resemblance theory does not fit the logical framework of depiction, in which 
pictures very often depict some, but no particular objects, while resemblance is a 
relation between two particular objects. Second, when one says that a picture 
resembles its object, one has to state specifically in what respects the resemblance 
consists. Third, some pictures do not resemble the object depicted, for example, 
cubist paintings, but we still say that those pictures depict. In chapter three, Hopkins 
tries to overcome the first two problems and proposes an experienced resemblance 
theory. According to him, although resemblance is a relation between particulars, 
experienced resemblance is not. Even though every experience is distinct, “the basic 
phenomenological facts are the same”. Our experiences are grouped 
phenomenologically into different sorts, thus resemblance can be experienced 
resemblance between sorts, rather than resemblance only between particulars (51).  
 
Outline Shape 
 The second problem, which is a more crucial one, involves the following 
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question: in what respect is the design of a picture experienced as resembling the 
object? Hopkins contends that unlike colour and tone, which only sometimes play a 
significant role in what a picture depicts, shape is always relevant. Hopkins asks us 
to imagine looking at objects through a misty window. We can trace the features of 
the objects on the glass surface. Although the shape of what we trace on the glass 
surface is two-dimensional, it is determined by the three-dimensional objects outside 
the window. The shape we obtained by means of tracing in the example is the 
outline shape of the objects. Let’s say the object of the tracing through the misty 
window is a pyramid. When we look at the pyramid, both the apex and the base of 
the pyramid subtend an angel to our eyes. When we move our gaze up from the base 
to the apex, the angle subtended by the face of the pyramid gradually decreases. 
Imagining there are vertical planes between the pyramid and our eyes, in each of 
these planes, we can trace the features of the pyramid, and indeed there are many, if 
not infinite, points making up the shape, and each of the points subtends an angle to 
the plane. The totality of the angles subtended in the individual plane is the solid 
angle. Since the pyramid subtends the same angles to each plane, the solid angles 
subtended to each plane are thus the same6. In Hopkins’s wording, “we can now 
 
6 Catherine Abell points out that in Hopkins’s recent formulation of the definition of 
outline shape, he has abandoned the notion of solid angle and adopted one in terms 
of “sets of directions from a point.” See Hopkins 2003b. For Abell’s article, see 
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define an object’s outline shape at a point as the solid angle it subtends at that point” 
(55). In our example, since the solid angle in every plane is the same, and the outline 
shape is the solid angle subtended in the plane, thus the outline shape in every plane 
is almost the same, but only vary in size. From some points in which when a solid 
angle of an object subtended is similar to the solid angle of other objects subtended, 
the outline shapes of the objects resemble each other. 
 Hopkins emphasizes three points about outline shape. First, the outline shape of 
an object is different from the silhouette of that object. The outline shape of an 
object may include the nested outline shapes of any parts that are on the faces of the 
solid angle. The possibility of nested outline shape can be explained by the nesting 
of solid angles. The solid angle subtended by an object may include smaller solid 
angles subtended by the parts of the faces. Second, the outline shape is “relative” to 
the feature of the object that the solid angle is subtended by. The outline shape of a 
face of a pyramid with a doorway is different from that without a doorway. A more 
detailed tracing would trace the doorway, so that the outline shape has more details. 
This matching of the outline shape and the feature of the traced object is important, 
for it accounts for the attribution of properties to objects in depiction. For example, 
in the case of the doorway, it accounts for the “difference between depicting the 
 
Abell 2005. 
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pyramid while depicting the doorway, and depicting it without depicting that 
entrance” (57). Third, objects without clear edges or contours can still have outline 
shapes. This includes something like a patch of mist, which has indeterminate 
contours and edges. As long as the patch varies through space, some parts of the 
patch subtend certain angles, while some other parts subtend different angles. Thus 
the item has a solid angle, although it varies from time to time. Hence, Hopkins 
claims that any object has a 3-D shape (the shape of the object in three-dimensional 
space), and thus has outline shape (57).  
 With the three cautions in hand, Hopkins continues to elaborate the notion of 
outline shape. He claims that outline shape is a property that we experience the 
object as having. Using Hopkins’s example, when one looks at a road which extends 
straight across a plain, one sees the edges of the road as converging at the vanishing 
point, although one’s knowledge of the 3-D shape of the road tells one that the edges 
of the road are not really converging. It is a mistake to say that one sees the road as 
converging because saying so suggests that one’s experience misrepresents the road, 
which does not really converge. Our saying that the edges are seen as converging 
can be re-formulated by saying that we see the outline shape of the edges as 
converging. In another example Hopkins mentions when looking from an oblique 
angle, we see the shape of a wagon wheel as elliptical. However, what is seen as 
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‘elliptical’ is not the 3-D shape of the wheel, but the outline shape of the wheel. 
Hopkins then contends that the term ‘elliptical’ cannot be applied to outline shape 
but only to 2-D shape since the outline shape is different from the 2-D shape in that 
the former is a point relative to the solid angle subtended from an object. Although 
the outline shape is not elliptical, during the tracing of the wheel, the tracing is 
elliptical; in this case, the 2-D shape shares the shape of the outline shape, so it is 
elliptical. In Hopkins’s wording, “It [‘elliptical’] describes the 2-D shape of an item 
which, from the appropriate angle, shares the wheel’s outline shape” (60).  
 Hopkins then points out the features of outline shapes. First, he states that the 
perception of outline shapes is part of the non-conceptual content of a picture, which 
means that one can process the experience of perceiving outline shapes even though 
one does not possess adequate concepts to characterize the content of the experience. 
Our perceptual experience involves different kinds of non-conceptual content; we 
see a cloud with clear contour but we may not be able to tell what shape it is, or we 
may hear a sound and be unable to tell what the source of the sound is. Perceiving 
the outline shape of objects is a kind of non-conceptual content of visual experience. 
Second, as 3-D shapes can be misperceived due to various factors, outline shapes 
can also be misperceived. When looking at a stick that is half emerged in water, due 
to the refraction of light, the stick appears bent. Hopkins claims that our experience 
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of seeing the stick as bent is a misperception of the outline shape of the stick, given 
that the “real” outline shape of the stick is what it is when it is on dry land (62). 
Hence, although the outline shapes we perceived are often accurate, it is possible 
that outline shapes may be misperceived under certain circumstances. Third, 
binocular vision causes the indeterminacy of outline shapes. As mentioned before, 
the outline shape is always relative to a point. When one perceives the outline shape 
of an object, the outline shape is relative to one’s eyes. However, since people 
usually perceive things with both eyes, which differ in position, the outline shapes 
perceived by each eye are slightly different from each other. Therefore, Hopkins 
points out that only a certain level of determinacy of outline shape can be attained 
under general vision, “…in binocular vision the point at which objects are 
represented as having their outline shapes is sufficiently indeterminate to include the 
position of both eyes, and any point the individual eyes might occupy while the 
outline shape is experienced as unchanged” (62-63). The limit of outline shape, if it 
really has one, would be the limit on its determinacy caused by the differences 
between the positions of the two eyes. 
 
Standard of Correctness 
 However, similarity in outline shape is not sufficient for depiction. In order to 
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avoid all kinds of idiosyncratic experiences, some kinds of intention should be 
introduced to the theory of experienced resemblance. In chapter four, Hopkins states 
at the beginning that depiction is necessarily an artifact; it is a human endeavor. 
Hence depiction is impossible without any creation by human beings. Second, 
although things could be seen in various situations, depiction is only possible when 
the things are intended to be seen. A rabbit could be seen in a cloud, but we do not 
say that the cloud depicts a rabbit7. With the above claims in mind, Hopkins adopts 
Richard Wollheim’s notion of the ‘standard of correctness’. According to Wollheim, 
a standard of correctness is a standard that governs what is depicted in a picture, and 
such a standard is given by the intention of the people who create the picture. 
However, intention is not the only standard governing what is depicted by a picture, 
since in the case of a photograph, the intention of the photographer can possibly be 
absent from the shooting of a photo, i.e. the photographer might accidentally press 
the shutter. In the case of cameras, as well as other media depending on automatism, 
the causal relation is the standard of correctness. Nonetheless, not all causal relations 
are relevant; for example, the fact that I loaded the film contributes to the possibility 
of shooting the photo, but this fact is not relevant to what is depicted by the photo. 
According to Hopkins, “[t]he relevant relations are those used for a certain purpose. 
 
7 These two assumptions are indeed controversial, different theories hold different 
views towards the role of the intention of the picture’s creator. 
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They are those exploited by someone who intends that whatever is the cause in the 
relevant chain be visible in whatever is the effect” (73).  
Hopkins then formulates a schema of an experiential theory of depiction as 
follows: 
(1) a/something F can be seen in [a surface] P 
And either 
(2i) (1) because someone intended that a/something F be seen there 
Or 
(2C) P is the product of a system successfully intended to produce surfaces 
causally related to objects in such a way that those objects can be seen in those 
surfaces, and (1) because P is so related to a/something F (77). 
Different experiential accounts of depiction hold different views on (1). For example, 
Christopher Peacocke holds that we see the object depicted by virtue of the 
experienced resemblance of the visual field shape (Peacocke 1983). Hopkins adopts 
the similarity of outline shape to explain our seeing of the object depicted: 
Something O is seen in a surface P iff P is experienced as resembling O in 
outline shape. (ibid) 
Hopkins maintains that the schema of an experiential theory of depiction together 
with the characterization of seeing-in provide a theory of experienced resemblance 
theory in outline shape for depiction. Next, based on the formulation above, he 
returns to his explananda and tries to explain how they are so by the experienced 
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resemblance theory in outline shape. He also raises and replies to some potential 
objections, and comes up with a refined formulation of his theory of depiction. 
 
Perspective 
 Motivated by the notion of seeing-in, Hopkins holds that our experience of 
perceiving the resemblance in outline shape is twofold, which means that two 
outline shapes are experienced. When we look at a picture of a horse, we first see 
part of the design of the picture, which is the outline shape of the picture 
corresponding to the object represented. In addition, we also see the outline shape of 
a horse. In order for us to experience the resemblance, the content of our experience 
must involve both seeing the outline shape of the design and a horse of certain 
outline shape (Hopkins 1998, 79). As the second outline shape is relative to a 
point/points, our seeing of the object depicted is necessarily relative to a point/points; 
nothing can be depicted unless it is depicted relatively to a point/points. Thus 
depiction is necessarily perspectival. 
In addition, it is worth noting that the second outline is not necessarily fully 
determinate. Like other kinds of resemblance, the resemblance of outline can be of 
something “fairly indeterminate”, although the indeterminacy has its limits (Hopkins 
1998, 80). The limit of the indeterminacy will be discussed in detail in a later 
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section. 
 
Minimum Content 
Hopkins’ first explanandum states that pictorial representation has significant 
minimum content. There are two features of this claim. First, Hopkins claims that 
there is no bare depiction of particulars; some properties have to be ascribed to the 
object depicted. Second, the claim about content is that properties ascribed to the 
depicted object of a pictorial representation “must” be more determinate than those 
ascribed by any possible linguistic representation. Obviously, the outline shape is a 
necessary property that is ascribed to the object. The outline shape that we 
experience of whatever the object depicted is, at least, a property ascribed to the 
object depicted. However, in spite of the outline shape, some other properties are 
also covered by the explanandum. 
Hopkins holds that outline shape correlates with other properties of the object 
depicted. The determinable properties that are correlated with outline shape are 
called ‘correlators’. Shape and orientation are two examples of correlators. The 
outline shape of an object changes when the shape of the object changes. For 
example, the outline shape of a watermelon would change if the shape of the 
watermelon changed from a sphere to a cube. In addition, the outline shape of an 
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object changes if the orientation of the object to the point, to which the outline shape 
is relative, changes. It is easy to imagine that the outline shape of a chair changes if 
the orientation of the chair changes when it is viewed from a fixed point. Since 
orientation and shape correlates with outline shape, any other properties that 
correlate with orientation and shape also correlate with outline shape. The 
determinacy of outline shape fixes that of the correlators, for when we perceive the 
outline shape of a chair, we also perceive the 3-D shape of the chair. The more 
determinate the outline shape is, the more determinate the 3-D shape is. Hence we 
can see why the correlators are reasonably determinate, for the outline shape is 
always reasonably determinate. 
However, why should properties other than outline shape be involved in our 
experience of resemblance? Is it possible for one merely to experience the design as 
resembling the outline shape of whatever is seen from the design, and no other 
properties, be the properties correlators or not? Hopkins contends that although this 
possibility does not violate (X1), it “seem[s] to betray (X1)’s spirit, since the content 
of such a picture would be very thin indeed” (83). Experiencing properties other 
than outline shape is necessary for an experience of resemblance since merely 
experiencing the resemblance in outline shape makes one unclear whether one is 
experiencing a present object as resembling an absent one.  
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In addition, in the depiction of particulars, we experience the design resembling 
the outline shape of the particular, therefore, at least one property—the outline shape 
of the particular—is ascribed to the object depicted. Under normal circumstances, 
when one perceives the similarity of the outline shape of a particular, properties 
more than the outline shape are ascribed to the object depicted. However, the creator 
of the picture does not necessarily refer to ascribed properties other than outline 
shape to a depiction of particular; since under rare situations, outline shape may be 
the only property ascribed to the object depicted (84). 
 
Other Resemblance 
 Following his discussion of outline shape-correlated properties, Hopkins 
discusses properties that are independent of outline shape. It is possible that in some 
cases, properties other than outline shape ascribed to an object depicted are the 
properties than the object does not actually possess, while the outline shape-related 
properties ascribed to the object depicted are those actually enjoyed by the object. 
For example, the outline shape of a boy is equal to his fairer-haired identical twin 
brother. One straightforward solution to this problem is that without altering the 
form of the experienced resemblance theory in outline shape, properties that are 
independent of outline shape are just added to the “characterization of the thing 
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resembled” (85); for instance, to see the fairer-haired identical twin brother in a 
picture is to see a surface with the marks resembling the outline shape of the 
fairer-haired boy. However, this straightforward solution is problematic since it fails 
to capture the phenomenology of seeing-in. 
Hopkins asks us to imagine looking at a photograph of some toy blocks. The 
experience differs phenomenologically when one looks at the photograph believing 
(1) that the photograph is a black and white picture that does not show what colour 
the blocks and background were, as opposed to (2) the photograph was in colour but 
the blocks and background happen to be black, white, and grey. The former case 
differs from the latter in that, for example, we may not have thoughts about the 
colour of the blocks in the former case, while we have the thought that the blocks 
are black and white in the latter case. The straightforward solution cannot account 
for this difference, since in both cases, one perceived the resemblance in outline 
shape of the black and white blocks. After all, to see a picture depicting the 
fairer-haired boy is to see the design resembling the outline shape of the boy plus the 
fairer-haired colour. However, resemblance in colour is not always necessary to 
seeing-in. A sketch may depict a woman without any colour. Therefore, while 
experienced resemblance in outline shape is always involved in the experience of 
seeing-in, experienced resemblance in colour is only involved sometimes. When we 
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experience resemblance in colour, the object must involve a colour; hence the colour 
must have a certain determinacy. So experienced resemblance in colour entails 
colour determinacy. 
Just as some properties are correlators of outline shape, there are properties 
correlated with colour, like tannedness. The determinacy of outline shape of an 
object fixes the determinacy of all the outline shape-correlators, and similarly, the 
determinacy of colour fixes the determinacy of all the colour-correlators. Hopkins 
concludes that in addition to perceived resemblance in outline shape being involved 
in seeing-in, perceived resemblance in colour may also be involved. Hopkins is open 
to the possibility that there are other forms of resemblance that we experience when 
we see things in pictures. However, no matter what these other forms of resemblance 
may turn out to be, that of outline shape is necessary to seeing-in. 
 
Misrepresentation 
By appealing to experienced resemblance, the experienced resemblance theory 
in outline shape has overcome the problem that the traditional resemblance theory 
faces, which is that the traditional resemblance theory does not fit the logical 
framework of depiction, in which pictures very often depict some, but no particular 
objects, while resemblance is a relation between two particular objects. This theory 
88 
 
also states specifically in what respects the resemblance consists, namely, 
necessarily, the outline shape, and not necessarily but in some cases, colour, as well 
as other possible properties, tones for example. The next question that Hopkins tries 
to deal with is that the objects seen in some pictures do not resemble their subjects, 
yet we claim that those pictures do represent their subject. Hopkins uses a caricature 
of Tony Blair, the ex-Prime Minister of Britain, to illustrate this problem of 
misrepresentation. The caricature, titled Kim Il Blair, represents Blair as having 
exaggerated characteristics, like huge ears, bulging cheeks, an enormous mouth with 
long teeth, etc. Of course Blair does not possess these properties, and the picture 
represents Blair as having these properties; hence the picture simply misrepresents 
Blair. The problem is that in this caricature, we see Blair, and at the same time, we 
see a thing with bulging cheeks, an enormous mouth, etc. These two things are 
irreconcilable since the outline shape of Blair and the outline shape of the thing with 
an enormous mouth are totally different. The problem is how we can see two things 
with different outline shape as the single subject of a picture. 
 In the previous discussion of ascribing properties to objects, it was suggested 
that properties can be roughly divided into two types: outline shape correlated 
properties and non-outline shape correlated properties. Misrepresentation causes 
problems for both kinds of properties. For if the misrepresented properties are 
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non-outline shape correlated, such as colour, it is hard to see how it is a property of 
what a surface is seen as resembling, since the object does not possess that property, 
and thus there is no resemblance. If the misrepresented properties are outline shape 
correlated, it is unclear how both the object and the misrepresented object, like the 
case of Blair and the thing with an enormous mouth, can be seen in the same 
surface. 
 One proposal is that a theory of depiction may choose to abandon its claim to 
apply to particulars. One can simply say that we see a thing with big ears, bulging 
cheeks, an enormous mouth, etc. without claiming that that thing is ex-Prime 
Minister Blair (97-98). However, this proposal fails if the misrepresentation of types 
is also possible. One may misrepresent human beings as having three arms, or four 
eyes. One option would be to abandon the depiction of types; however, doing so 
would leave the content of depiction problematically empty, for if depiction cannot 
apply to particulars and types, to what else can depiction apply to? 
 Two alternative proposals are that one may deal with the problem by appealing 
to the misrepresentation of parts and to some notion of the degree of 
misrepresentation. One may claim that we see both Blair and the thing with an 
enormous mouth because some parts of the picture are seen as resembling Blair 
while some parts of it are seen as resembling a thing with an enormous mouth, huge 
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quaffed hair, etc. Although different parts are seen as resembling different things, no 
parts are seen as resembling both Blair and the thing with an enormous mouth (101). 
Hopkins replies that this may solve the problem of misrepresentation of particulars 
in some kinds of pictures, but not in caricature because, very often, there is no part 
in the caricature that actually resembles the subject. In the case of the caricature of 
Blair, no matter what viewing angle we take to observe Blair, we cannot observe any 
parts of Tony Blair as having the outline that the caricature represents Blair as 
having. Furthermore, the proposal presupposes that the separation and location of 
discrete spatial parts are possible; however, such a presupposition “threatens to 
break our hold on the notion of a spatial part altogether” (101). 
 Another attempt is to try to explain our seeing of both Blair and the thing with 
an enormous mouth by appealing to the degree of experienced resemblance. So the 
caricature of Blair is seen as resembling both Blair and the thing with an enormous 
mouth, but only to a certain degree. Although this attempt seemingly accommodates 
our seeing in the surface both the object and the misrepresented object, it violates 
the phenomenology of seeing-in. For seeing the design of the surface as resembling 
both Blair and the enormous mouth thing involves two seen resemblances: one is the 
seen resemblance between the surface and Blair, another is the seen resemblance 
between the surface and the enormous mouth thing. However, our experience of 
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seeing-in does not involve two experiences of resemblances separately; we see the 
surface as resembling Blair with an enormous mouth.  
 Hopkins asks us to imagine three different cases. First, one may see one thing 
in one part of a picture while seeing a different thing in another; second, one may 
see one thing in one part of a picture at a moment, and see another thing in the same 
part at another moment. An example of the latter is the famous duck-rabbit picture. 
The picture is seen as resembling a duck at one moment, while it is seen as 
resembling a rabbit at another. One switches from seeing the duck and the rabbit 
from time to time, but not seeing the same part as resembling both the rabbit and the 
duck at the same time. Third, one may simply see one thing in one part of the 
surface. For example, in The School of Athens, one sees Plato as having long white 
hair and Aristotle as having short brown hair. Hopkins holds that the experience of 
seeing-in indeed belongs to the third case. We see in a surface Blair with huge ears, 
an enormous mouth, etc., but we do not see different parts as resembling Blair, or 
the enormous mouth thing; nor do we experience switching experiences of 
resemblance of Blair and the enormous mouth thing.  
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The Solution 
 The previous deliberations suggest that seeing the caricature of a 
misrepresented figure involves experiencing two resemblances: one is that of the 
misrepresented object, while the other experience is that of the object as having the 
misrepresented properties. Yet these two resemblances violate the phenomenology 
of seeing-in. The separation of two experiences of resemblance is indeed based on 
the assumption that when an object is depicted by virtue of our experiencing the 
resemblance between the design of the surface and the outline shape of the object, 
the depiction depicts the object as it really is. Thus when one sees the caricature of 
Blair as having misrepresented properties, one is forced to admit that one sees both 
the resemblance of the outline shape of Blair as he really is, and at the same time, 
the resemblance of the outline shape of Blair with the misrepresented properties. 
 Hopkins proposes that the problem of two resemblances can be solved by 
abandoning the assumption that when an object is depicted, the object is depicted as 
it really is (104). Thus when one sees the caricature of Blair with those 
misrepresented properties, one actually experiences the resemblance between the 
design surface and the outline shape of Blair with those misrepresented properties, 
e.g. an enormous mouth, huge ears, quaffed hair, etc. Given this proposal, there is 
only one resemblance, instead of two, involved in our seeing of the misrepresented 
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object as having misrepresented properties. The resemblance between the design of 
the surface and the outline shape of Blair as he really is does not matter to our seeing 
Blair as being misrepresented; what does matter is that the design of the surface is 
experienced as resembling Blair.  
Despite solving this problem of misrepresentation, the proposal also possesses 
the advantages of matching our intuition about depiction and not violating the 
phenomenology of seeing-in (104-105). Our intuition about depiction is that the 
picture resembles what is seen in it. Appealing directly to the resemblance in the 
outline shape of the object with the misrepresented properties matches this intuition 
about depiction. Furthermore, the experience of resemblance also matches the 
phenomenology of seeing-in. Thus one sees the object with misrepresented 
properties in the surface by experiencing the resemblance between the design 
surface and the outline of the object with those misrepresented properties. 
 However, as noted above, the solution requires us to abandon the assumption 
that depictions resemble the item as it really is, and this may entail a problem for the 
proposal. Blair is hardly alone in not possessing the misrepresented properties: 
neither does Clinton, for example. Why, then, is it Blair, and not Clinton, who is 
seen in the caricature? The outline shape of the thing with an enormous mouth may 
also possibly be similar to Clinton with those properties. The upshot of this 
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objection is that abandoning the assumption makes it impossible to see particulars, 
as well as types, in pictures. In order to solve this problem, Hopkins offers the 
second solution. 
 Hopkins contends that the above problem arises because what he calls ‘the 
indifference principle’ is contravened by our saying that seeing Blair with those 
features is different from seeing Clinton with them. The indifference principle is 
about our experience of resemblance in general, and states that “if two things match 
in respect of some property R, no third thing could be experienced as resembling, in 
respect of R, one of those things but not the other” (107-108).  
Hopkins argues, however, that the Indifference Principle is simply wrong. The 
principle attempts to limit the specification of our experience of resemblance to 
features that are dependent on a certain property R, and that property R is the respect 
in which the resemblance is experienced. This means that nothing can vary 
independently of R and be the feature in respect to which the resemblance is 
experienced. This means that if a property can vary independently of R and is 
mentioned as the feature in respect to which the resemblance is experienced, 
resemblance would be experienced to one of two things differing in that feature but 
matching in R. The counter-example that Hopkins gives is that one can hear the 
noise of one’s car as resembling a baby wailing in respect of the rhythm of its rising 
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and falling tones, even if one’s vacuum cleaner has the same very rhythm of 
changing tones (ibid). Furthermore, the Indifference Principle limits the 
specification of experienced resemblance in respect to R by restricting mentioning 
the R-ness of the resembled object. Hopkins argues that this cannot be right, 
otherwise experiencing the resemblance to something else is impossible. He 
comments:  
[W]e perceive something R, and experience it as resembling something else R. 
But if there is nothing more to be said about that second item than that it is 
itself R, it is wholly unclear that we experience a present object as resembling 
an absent one. We seem instead simply to be repeating to ourselves that the 
object before us is R. In short, if experiences of resemblance were bound by the 
principle, the only properties (the thought of which) they would involve would 
be those of the resembling object (108). 
As the Indifference Principle does not limit the possible experience of resemblance, 
Hopkins proposes that what limits the possible experience of resemblance is indeed 
what limits our possible experience in general. For example, it would sound very 
odd and incorrect to say that one saw a rock as resembling the 3-D shape of a female 
sea horse, but not as resembling a male sea horse. This is because in general, we 
cannot distinguish a male sea horse from a female sea horse by normal vision. In 
addition, the limits of our visual experience in general are the limits on the visual 
experience of resemblance. Return to the example of the picture of a thing with an 
enormous mouth. Seeing the marks on the surface as resembling Blair with the 
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properties ascribed by the picture indeed differs from seeing the marks as 
resembling Clinton with those properties, since there would be a difference should 
you see Blair as opposed to Clinton with those properties.  
If this is sound, the next question concerns the differences between seeing Blair 
with those features and seeing Clinton with those features. In order to answer this 
question, Hopkins appeals to the application of concepts to visual experience. The 
strongest position on this topic is that our visual experience does not merely 
represent things as having various properties, but representing the properties of a 
particular or kind. According to this strong view, the concept of a particular enters 
the content of experience, so the concepts of a particular can also enter the content 
of experience of resemblance in outline shape. This accounts for the difference of 
seeing Blair with an enormous mouth, etc., and seeing Clinton with these properties.  
Nevertheless, Hopkins concedes that the claim that there can be singular 
experiential content is controversial, so he adopts a more moderate view to the effect 
that even though concepts of particulars cannot enter the contents of experience, the 
application of the concepts are still justified by experience (110). Hopkins contends, 
for example, that on seeing a woman with all of the features and mannerisms of 
one’s mother (and no conflicting ones), one would, under usual circumstances, judge 
that the person is indeed one’s mother; such a judgment is rather immediate and 
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irresistible (ibid). Since in this weaker position, the concepts of particular do not 
enter the content of experience, the difference between seeing Blair with the odd 
properties and seeing Clinton with those properties is not phenomenological. 
Nonetheless, a slight modification enables the weaker position to account for the 
difference between seeing Blair with the odd properties and Clinton with those 
properties: 
[M]ost distinct pictorial contents engender in us (phenomenologically) distinct 
experiences; some merely engender a distinctive wider set of reaction—an 
experience which is not phenomenologically unique, coupled to a conceptual 
response to that experience which is (111).  
Hopkins adds that what he argues with regard to the depiction of particular things 
would also do for the depiction of types. And he argues that the question ‘why does 
the caricature induce one of the experiences but not the other?”, should not be 
answered by philosophy, but by other disciplines. What Hopkins, qua philosopher, 
wants to account for is what it is to see Blair, but not Clinton, in the surface. He 
means to do this by characterizing the seeing-in experience, which provides an 
analysis of the notion of depiction. However, answering the empirical question of 
why one thing is seen rather than the other lies outside the realm of philosophy 
(112-113). 
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The Limits on Misrepresentation 
After discussing what it is to see a misrepresented object on the basis of the 
design of a surface, in other words, why pictorial misrepresentation is possible, 
Hopkins goes on to a consideration of the limits on misrepresentation. For example, 
is it possible that the picture of Blair with an enormous mouth and other odd 
properties could be a misrepresentation of Clinton?  
 Although we do see that Blair is misrepresented as having those odd features, it 
is possible for us to see the picture as resembling Clinton with those features. 
Therefore, Hopkins claims, it is contingent for us seeing Blair with the odd features 
in the picture, and it is also contingent that Blair with those features is intended to be 
seen in the picture by the artist. It seems that what the picture does and does not 
depict is merely a contingent fact; does this mean that there is no limits or constraint 
on misrepresentation? Hopkins holds that how a thing really is affects what we see 
as resembling a thing; this applies to experienced resemblance in outline shape as 
well. For example, when we see the marks on a surface as resembling Blair with an 
enormous mouth, wild eyes, huge ears, and the like, our being able to see the 
resemblance partly depends on how Blair really is, partly on how mouths really are, 
etc. How things really are thus provides a cluster of constraints that constrain how 
the surface should be in order for the surface to be able to sustain an experienced 
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resemblance in outline shape. However, some of these constraints cannot be met 
simultaneously. For example, Hopkins claims that the constraint on a set of marks in 
which something with only the features of a saxophone can be seen is incompatible 
with the constraint on marks in which Clinton can be seen, since these two 
constraints cannot be met by any one set of marks (120). The incompatibilities 
between constraints are the limits of misrepresentation.  
 Hopkins claims that this explanation does not tell us which sets of constraints 
cannot be met simultaneously. It follows, he believes, that the explanation does not 
state which misrepresentations are and are not possible. However, the explanation 
does explain what counts as the limits of misrepresentation, and what governs the 
limits of misrepresentation, namely, how things really are. 
 
Indeterminacy and Interpretation 
 In the last section, we have discussed the problem of misrepresentation, 
understood as the attribution of properties to an object that it does not really enjoy; 
in this section, we are going to see how Hopkins handle a similar, and equally 
significant problem in depiction, namely the indeterminacy of depiction. 
 Indeterminacy in pictures is just as prevalent as misrepresentation. Just imagine 
a stick-figure picture. It is prima facie correct for us to say that the picture depicts 
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something, and more specifically, that it depicts a man. Moreover, it depicts a man 
with some features, like having a round head, two arms, and two legs. The problem 
is that the shape that we see in the marks on the surface is different from the outline 
shape of a person. The problem is how one sees these two different shapes as 
resembling each other. The case of indeterminacy is quite different from 
misrepresentation in the sense that the stick-figure picture neither depicts a man with 
odd properties nor is seen as resembling a man. The picture does not ascribe 
properties to the man that he does not enjoy; rather, it does not ascribe any 
properties to the man except some necessary features of a standing person. The 
features that the picture keeps silent about are the indeterminate content of the 
picture; the indeterminate content includes shape, colour, the number of fingers on 
each hand, etc. Pictorial indeterminacy falls into roughly two kinds: either the 
property ascribed is reasonably but not completely determinate, or there is no 
determinate property ascribed. The example for the former case is the head of the 
stick-figure picture. The stick-figure is depicted as having a head, although it is 
indeterminate whether the person is bald or not. For the latter case, there is no 
determinate colour of the stick-figure picture, so the person is depicted as having no 
colour at all. 
 Advocates of the resemblance view can attempt to deal with these examples in 
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two ways. One way is to claim that if a picture’s content is indeterminate in some 
respect, our experience of it is also indeterminate. In other words, the source of the 
indeterminacy in pictorial content lies in the indeterminacy of our experience of it. 
This approach ties the indeterminacy of pictorial content to the indeterminacy of the 
experience of seeing-in; Hopkins calls this approach the ‘Marriage approach’. 
Another approach is separating the indeterminacy in pictorial content from the 
seeing-in experience, meaning that the depicted object is indeterminate although 
what is seen in it is not. In other words, the indeterminacy of pictorial content does 
not lie in our experience of it. This approach separates the indeterminacy in pictorial 
content from the indeterminacy in seeing-in. Hopkins calls this approach the 
‘Separation account’ (128).  
 The marriage account seems inadequate to cope with the problem of 
indeterminacy in pictorial content. The marriage account is able to account for 
indeterminacy in some cases by “locating a corresponding indeterminacy in what is 
seen in the picture” (124). For example, in the stick-figure picture, we see a 
colour-neutral picture, which is indeterminate in colour, so we see a person that is 
indeterminate in colour. Nonetheless, the marriage account fails to account for some 
respects. If one says that the stick-figure picture resembles the outline shape of a 
person, thus it depicts a person, then the outline shape of the person resembled has 
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to be very indeterminate since otherwise the marks on the surface cannot be 
experienced as resembling that person. However, our experience of resemblance is 
hardly so indeterminate. Therefore accepting the marriage account would “put the 
resemblance view in an uncomfortable situation” (124).  
 Another approach, just as the Separation account purports, is to accept that 
what is depicted may be indeterminate even though what is seen in the surface is not. 
This separation implies that what is seen is can be different from what is depicted. In 
the stick-figure picture, what we see in it is a person with an odd shape; however, 
the stick-figure picture does not depict an oddly-shaped person. According to this 
account, what the marks are seen as resembling is not a stick-figure like person, but 
something that is more determinate. Recall the example of two photographs, one in 
black and white and one in colour, of toy blocks. It happens that the toy blocks and 
the background are in shades of grey, and therefore that two photographs are 
indistinguishable. However, the difference between the two situations is, Hopkins 
claims, that what we see in the colour photograph is what it depicts, while what we 
see in the black and white photograph is not (125). The limit of determinacy of what 
is seen in the surface depends on the limit of visual experience (127). 
 However, the separation account’s separation of the content of depiction and 
the experience of seeing-in seemingly contradicts the experiential approach more 
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generally, since what is seen in a picture does not match the content of the picture. 
Nonetheless, the pictorial content is not totally free from the experience of seeing-in. 
Given the basic insight behind the experiential approach, which is that a picture 
depicts O only if O is correctly seen in it, a picture cannot depict a dog if everyone 
sees a cat in it; yet, a picture may depict a dog even though a greenish dog is seen in 
an over-exposed photograph (128). If seeing-in does not constrain pictorial content 
in a way that every aspect of what is seen is depicted, what else can constrain what 
aspects are depicted? Hopkins holds that the answer is the standard of correctness: 
“The picture will depict only those features of what is seen in it which the causal or 
intentional history of the surface makes it right to see there” (129). 
 Hopkins then proposes that the second question is what enables the viewer to 
see the depicted content. He claims that in order to deal with this question, it is 
necessary first to look at how pictures are interpreted (He asks the reader to put 
aside the separation account and simply assume there is no separation of pictorial 
content and the seeing-in experience). The interpretation of pictures concerns the 
explananda (X5) and (X6), which claim that the knowledge of the appearance of the 
depicted object and the general competence with depiction are necessary and jointly 
sufficient for interpreting pictures. Since the experiential account takes seeing-in as 
the core of picture interpretation, we explain depiction by experiences of seeing the 
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picture: what a picture depicts is necessarily what can be seen in the picture, which 
is jointly sufficient with the application of some sorts of standard. One may wonder 
whether anything more can be said about seeing-in, such as exactly what resources 
are needed to see something in a picture? Hopkins claims that one’s general 
competence to see the outline shape and the resemblance in outline shape is essential 
to see in pictures, and this general competence is not a “trivial ability.” It may 
require training to see the outline shape, and seeing the resemblance in outline 
would require even more training (131). However, the general competence alone is 
not sufficient. In order to see a horse, in addition to seeing a resemblance in outline 
shape, one “must also be able to see the picture as resembling a horse” (ibid), and 
“the ability to see resemblances in outline shape requires an awareness or conception 
of the things to which resemblance is experienced” (132).  
The awareness or conception can be identified with the knowledge of 
appearance in (X5) and (X6), although the nature of the awareness or the conception 
is “rather obscure” (ibid). The resemblance view takes the notion of seeing-in as the 
core of the experience; when one sees an object in a picture, it necessarily involves a 
thought of the depicted, but absent, object. The resemblance view identifies the 
awareness or the conception with the thought of the absent object in seeing-in, and 
they are involved in the experience of resemblance because the marks on the surface 
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are seen as resembling: “It is that seeing-in involves whatever it is which 
experiences of resemblance in general involve—something I have, without 
considering the phrase illuminating, been calling the awareness/conception of the 
resembled object” (133).  
 Skeptics may question the identification of the awareness with the knowledge 
of appearance since the knowledge of appearance is a visual notion while the 
appearance, which means the outline shape of the object, is geometrical. This means 
that an invisible object may have outline shape, while such an object, being invisible, 
obviously does not have any visual appearance. So experiencing the resemblance in 
outline shape does not necessarily involve the knowledge of the appearance of the 
object in question; this claim makes (X6) questionable: the knowledge of the 
appearance of the thing depicted may not be necessary for interpretation of pictures. 
In order to solve this problem, Hopkins holds that no sense other than vision can be 
the means of access to outline shape; we can only detect outline shapes by seeing 
(134). However, our detection of outline shapes only by means of seeing is a 
contingent fact, since it is imaginable that with the help of some devices, we could 
able to detect outline shape of invisible objects (135). If this is so, there is possibly 
another form of representation that relies on the experience of resemblance in 
outline shape, and that is not limited to representation the visible. With our intuition 
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and the explananda, especially explananda (X3) and (X6), this kind of representation, 
which is akin to depiction, would be rejected as depiction. However, Hopkins claims, 
whether the putative representation counts as depiction can be controversial:  
The putative form of representation lies on a continuum of possible ways to 
represent, a continuum of forms of representation more or less akin to our 
paradigm cases of depiction. The kinship can be sufficiently strong, or weak, 
for the form of representation clearly to count, or not to count, as depiction. In 
many cases, however, including the one in hand, there is simply no answer to 
the question. We can legislate how we like on the matter, but we should not 
succumb to the illusion of thinking that what we say reflects anything 
substantial about the concept of depiction itself (136). 
 
Separation and interpretation 
 Returning to the notion of separation, adopting Separation means the content of 
seeing-in is no longer a straightforward guide to pictorial content since what the 
picture depicts is less determinate than what one sees in the picture. Thus in order to 
interpret the picture correctly, one has to decide which aspects of what one sees in 
the surface are essential to what the picture depicts, and which aspects are not. 
General competence and the knowledge of appearance of the depicted item do not 
suffice for such decision for they only participate in seeing the resemblance in 
outline shape. Hopkins claims that three kinds of general knowledge are decisive to 
the decision making (137-138). The first kind is the knowledge of what sort of thing 
that the world contains. This kind of knowledge is very general; for example, when 
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one sees a greenish dog in a photograph, with the knowledge that normally no 
greenish dog exists in the world, one would conclude that the greenishness of the 
dog is not what the photograph depicts; the greenishness may simply due to some 
mistreatment of the negative of the photograph, or abnormal lighting. The second 
kind of knowledge is how things are generally depicted. This kind of knowledge 
concerns the viewer’s understanding of how the sort of items seen in the picture tend 
to be depicted: “artists very often intend to depict items of the sort they take the 
world to contain. Since there is no reason for the viewer to think that either she or 
the artists is insane, the items depicted will thus be of a sort the viewer also takes the 
world, by and large, to contain” (138). The third kind of knowledge is that of the 
various means of depiction production. Depiction can be the result of various means, 
and different means involve different factors relating to the standard of correctness 
governing depiction. Some of these factors are dependent on the creator’s intention 
or some kinds of causal dependence, which is the standard of correctness, and some 
are independent. Understanding these factors helps us to decide what aspect in the 
content of seeing-in is depicted, and what aspect is not. For example, the artist’s 
intention is irrelevant to the colour of a black and white photograph, since no matter 
what the artist’s intention is, it does not affect the fact that there is no colour 
available in a black and white photograph. Therefore, the factor of colour in black 
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and white photographs is independent of the standard of correctness. When one sees 
toy blocks in grey shade in a black and white photograph, one knows that the 
photograph does not depict the blocks in such grey shade since one understands that 
a black and white photograph is not able to present any colour except shades of grey, 
and it is also not something that the intention of the photographer can change. The 
limitations of different media “prevent such intentions from being fulfilled” (138). 
Due to these limitations, some factors of the means of depiction are unable to reflect 
the creator’s intention or the causal genesis, and factors that fail to do so are 
irrelevant to pictorial content. A correct interpretation of the content of pictures 
requires the viewer be aware of these limitations and of the content-independent 
factors. 
 The interpretation of a picture’s content takes place when the viewer applies 
these three forms of knowledge. These three forms of knowledge interact until an 
equilibrium is finally reached. Hence, Hopkins claims, the interpretation of pictorial 
content is a delicate matter, and runs parallel to our interpretation of many aspects of 
our environment (140).  
 
Separation and Some Unfinished Explanations 
 We have seen from last section that by supplementing the three kinds of 
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knowledge as the resources needed for pictorial content interpretation, (X5) and (X6) 
are secured under the introduction of Separation. However, are other explananda 
also secured when Separation is applied? Under Separation, the depicted content is 
less determinate than what is seen in a picture. Would this lead to the possibility that 
the loss of determinacy is so great that a picture depicts its object without depicting 
any property of it? This may threaten (X1). Similarly, what (X2) and (X3) claim is 
that a depicted object should be depicted from at least a point of view; the visibility 
of the object depicted may also be threatened by Separation (142). Hopkins holds 
that the solution appeals to the standard of correctness, which should encompass the 
possibility of (X1) to (X3), and, at the same time, leave room for Separation, so that 
the standard of correctness should not allow that what can be seen in a surface is all 
that the surface depicts. 
 Hopkins holds that the creator of a picture who intends to depict some 
particular thing can only fulfill that intention by marking the surface deliberately and 
in accordance with some properties of that particular. During this process, she is able 
to see what can be seen from the surface. Therefore, “she must, in order words, 
refine her intentions as she enacts them. And so at least some of the properties 
visible in the surface will be depicted by it—as (X1) requires”(ibid). Yet what about 
those cases where it is not intention, but causation, that sets the standard of 
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correctness? Hopkins holds that for a particular, b, to act causally on surface P 
through a causal relation R, some of b’s properties must be “causally efficacious” in 
the process. If the picture depicts b, b’s properties that is visible in P thus are those b 
really enjoys. Only by generating the properties of a particular on P by the properties 
themselves, could the causal relation have the flexibility and sensitivity necessary 
for open-ended depictive intentions, such as a photograph being intended to depict 
whatever is responsible for the marks on the surface. “The argument exploits the fact 
that no causal relation could have the flexibility required in order to underwrite 
depiction unless it generated some properties seen in the surface from those 
properties themselves” (146). Therefore, (X1) is still secured after the introduction 
of Separation, and it also allows the possibility of Separation. 
 Hopkins holds that the arguments and considerations evoked above apply to 
(X2) and (X3) as well, with only some necessarily amendments, and the explananda 
also allow the possibility of separation. “Similar consideration can take us from the 
necessity of seeing in a surface properties which are both reasonably determinate 
and visual, and some orientation to a point, to the necessary of such things being 
depicted. Further, they can do so without threatening the possibility of Separation” 
(146). 
 
111 
 
Accommodating diversity: resemblance, convention and drawing in perspective 
 So far we have discussed some major issues in depiction: the nature of 
depiction, pictorial visual experience, misrepresentation, and indeterminacy. One 
remaining problem is how the experienced resemblance theory accommodates the 
diversity of depiction. The diversity of depiction leads to problems at two ends that a 
theory of depiction has to accommodate: first, indistinguishable marks may depict 
different objects; in other words, they may have different pictorial content; and 
second, distinct marks may depict the same thing; they possess the same pictorial 
content (147).  
 For the first case, if two indistinguishable marks depict different objects, they 
must be experienced as resembling different things, and both experiences are 
legitimate. The legitimacy of experiencing the marks as resembling different objects 
can be the result of a difference in the standard of correctness. However, the 
possibility of whether the same marks can be experienced as resembling different 
things is in question. We have seen what it is to see something in a surface, and why 
a certain object is seen rather than others (recall the reason why one sees Blair in a 
picture rather than seeing it as Clinton). However, Hopkins claims, it is an empirical 
question, and not philosophy’s job to provide the answer to why the marks on the 
surface are seen as resembling in outline shape a certain object rather than others. 
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And since this question is directly related to the question why one sees a mark as 
resembling a certain object, while others see the same mark as resembling other 
objects, the reason why indistinguishable marks can be seen as resembling different 
objects is indeed empirical; “So nothing in our account of depiction precludes 
different subjects seeing the same marks as resembling different things. All that is 
needed is some suitable variation in the empirical determinants of the experiences of 
resemblance. Given that, and appropriate differences in histories of production, 
similar marks can carry different pictorial meanings” (151). According to Hopkins, 
reasons for such variation include convention, individual encounters with other 
pictures, and other possibilities. 
 Given the considerations just introduced, the problem of indistinguishable 
marks depicting different objects is accommodated. Another problem is whether it is 
possible for different marks to depict the same thing. In other words, is it possible 
for different marks to possess the same pictorial content? With this question in mind, 
Hopkins first tries to explain the diversity of depiction systems. He claims that 
systems can achieve their diversity by providing different details of the same item; 
or they can simply be indeterminate with regard to different aspects of the depicted 
objects (153). With regard to the possibility of different marks possessing the exact 
pictorial content, Hopkins holds that this possibility lies also in cultural factors: “We 
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ntroduction of Hopkins’s experienced resemblance theory. I now 
                                                
there considered the role of perceptual expectation based on past acculturation as 
determining the ‘resembled’ side of the formula; but it seems equally likely to 
influence which marks can fill the ‘resembling’ role”(ibid). How about 
non-perspectival8 depiction? Hopkins claims that when a spatial property is depicted 
with a certain determinacy, representations of other spatial properties would also be 
represented with a certain determinacy (157). Due to the fact that non-perspectival 
systems fail to preserve outline shapes of the item drawn, they only depict, if they 
can, objects in a reasonably indeterminate manner. Thus Hopkins concludes that 
“[s]o the experienced-resemblance view, coupled to our theoretical constraint on 
depiction and our sense of what is psychologically possible for us, does seem to 
preclude any depiction of spatial detail that is not depiction in perspective” (158). 
 Here ends my i
turn to a survey of criticisms of Lopes’s and Hopkins’s theory. 
 
8 The meanings of ‘perspectival’ or ‘perspective’ refer to the perspectival drawing 
systems in which outline shape of the item drawn is preserved. See p. 153. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CRITIQUES TO THE ASPECT-RECOGNITION THEORY 
 
In this chapter, I survey the critiques of Lopes’s aspect-recognition theory. 
Critiques of the theory can mainly be divided into critiques concerning, first, 
pictorial aspects; second, the recognitional capacity; third, the referent and source of 
the information; and, fourth, the transparency of pictures. I will first survey the 
critiques made by other philosophers, and then focus on Hopkins’s objections to the 
aspect-recognition theory. 
 
Questions Concerning Pictorial Aspects 
According to Lopes, the explicit non-commitment of pictures is what 
distinguishes pictorial representation from other kinds of representation, such as 
natural languages (refer to chapter 3, pictorial aspects). However, a number of 
philosophers question the sufficiency of explicit non-commitment to pictorial 
representation. Anthony Savile, in his review of Lopes’s book (Savile 2000: 
158-162), raised doubts about Lopes’s distinction between descriptions and pictures. 
Savile argues that although it is true that a picture of a bowlered bulldog is explicitly 
non-committal whether he is bald or not, a description of the bowlered bulldog is 
also explicitly non-committal. Recall Lopes’s argument that describing something as 
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having one property can always allow describing it as having another properties by 
supplementing the previous description of the object. However, Savile argues that 
this is simply not right, since a description can only describe an object with certain 
properties at a time: “It may be true that in representing the bulldog as bowlered I 
cannot show him as bald, but then in describing him as hated I cannot at the same 
time be forthcoming about the state of his scalp either. Of course I can go on to 
describe him as bald, but then equally I can go on to paint him as bald (having 
removed his bowler)” (Savile 2000: 161). Savile extends his argument by claiming 
that given Lopes’s formulation, a perfume, or even a good meal can be examples of 
pictures. Every picture is explicitly non-committal in some ways, while some 
respects are chosen to be committal, some others are precluded. However, a 
particular perfume, for example, can also be explicitly non-committal for the scent 
of the perfume may prevent other scent in the situation be detected. “A particular 
perfume may prevent other olfactory information about a situation from being 
detected by a competent nose—consider air fresheners—and in the realm of taste, an 
aioli inevitably masks other features of the dish it enhances (the fish’s lack of 
freshness)” (Savile 2000, 162).  
 Daniel Herwitz raises a similar question about the role of aspects in Lopes’s 
account. He argues that the choices that a writer makes are also explicitly 
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non-committal in the sense that by showing the character in a certain way, the writer 
has to preclude showing the character in other ways. “The writerly choice of not to 
show a character through the medium of words is an inherently precluding one: by 
showing X one must leave out Y, and a good bit of writing consists in formulating 
the terms for these restrictions” (Herwitz 2000, 386). Under Lopes’s account, 
language would be counted as pictures as well—on the assumption that aspect-based 
content is sufficient to pictorial sense. 
 
Questions Concerning the References and Sources of Information 
Philosopher Ira Newman questions Lopes’s ‘naturalized account of pictorial 
reference’ (Newman 1998, 274-275). Lopes claims that pictures are ways of 
“gathering, storing, and transmitting visual information about their subjects” (Lopes 
1996, 144). However, how the information is transmitted by the marks on the 
surface of a picture is never told. The information cannot be transmitted as linguistic 
symbols, otherwise his account would recapitulate the linguistic model of Goodman 
that Lopes has rejected; nor can Lopes explain the hypothesized information 
transmission in terms of the resemblance between marks and the subject, as 
otherwise his account would be unable to claim that resemblance is independent, 
and thus the production, of depiction. 
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 Denial Herwitz also questions the referential system of Lopes’s theory. He 
contends that Lopes’s account is problematic in explaining fictive pictures. Recall 
the example of the painting of Bathsheba by Rembrandt, Lopes argues that the 
painting depicts the model rather than the fictional character Bathsheba, since the 
visual information of the painting refers to the model; and it is make-belief that the 
picture depicts the fictional character. However, according to Herwitz, it is possible, 
although rare, that under some particular schema, the painting depicts both the 
model and the fictional character. And for most cases of fictional pictures, the model 
is “meant to disappear”, and all competent viewers would think so under the relevant 
schema. The underlying reason is that reference is not merely causal, but also 
intentional (Herwitz 1999, 388). 
 
Questions Concerning the Transparency of Pictures 
Lopes’s claim that all pictures are transparent is controversial. Philosopher 
Gordon Graham doubts whether fictive pictures, which are works of imagination, 
can be seen through. This is because to ensure that fictive pictures, whose objects do 
not exist, can be seen through, Lopes appeals to Walton’s make-believe theory. 
Although the original claim made by Walton about the application of the 
make-believe theory is that all pictures are fictional, Lopes incorporates the 
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make-believe theory in explaining only fictive pictures. According to Lopes, viewers 
have to identify the source of the target of make-believe. However, Graham is 
suspicious whether Lopes’s claim can be plausibly applied to cartoon characters: 
“Does anyone really pretend, or need to pretend, that there is an original ‘source’ for 
Mickey Mouse or Popeye, which the cartoon drawing represents? We see these as 
drawn originals, and yet they are representational, not abstract, drawings” (Graham 
1999, 400). If Lopes cannot answer Graham’s doubts about cartoon, the 
aspect-recognition theory is defective. 
Daniel Herwitz is also suspicious about the bald claim that all pictures are 
transparent. He argues that Lopes’s theory of depiction needs the transparency thesis 
because the Gombrichean notion of aspect presentation requires belief, attitude, 
concept and other mental states to ensure the referentiality of pictures. However, 
Lopes’s “causal theory of reference” moves from the referent to a picture, and to the 
referent finally. In moving from the picture to the referent, the process undergoes a 
“sublevel of belief” (Herwitz 1999, 387). Here is why Lopes needs the notion of 
transparency in pictures, for transparency is used to describe the 
believe-independent relation between the pictures and the one who creates them. 
However, Herwitz holds that the bald claim, which is made by Lopes, that all 
pictures are visual prostheses goes too far. Grasping the aspectual properties of 
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Cubist paintings requires a lot of training in belief and attitude to reconstruct and 
understand the paintings, since the depiction in cubist works depends on how the 
world is believed to be, and “depiction in Picasso’s works makes visible in the 
charm and construction of its objects aspects of the world that are not visible but a 
matter of knowledge” (Herwitz 1999, 387). He also believes that the claim that all 
pictures are transparent, which means belief-independent, makes the notion of belief 
obscure: “…a theory of depiction cannot be exhausted by a theory of 
belief-independent transparency with its implication that paintings are 
prostheses—as if, finally, one knew what belief was in sufficiently clear terms to be 
able to say with confidence what is and what is not “belief independent”” (Herwitz 
1999, 387-8).  
 
Hopkins’s Objection to the Aspect-recognition Theory 
In his review to Lopes’s book Understanding Pictures, Hopkins questions 
Lopes’s definition of pictorial representations of properties and kinds (refer to 
chapter 3: Pictorial Recognition for the distinction of basic portrayal and basic 
depiction). Unlike the depiction of particulars, claims Hopkins, the notion of an 
information link involved in the depiction of properties is unclear. In the example of 
a picture with a pure property content given by Hopkins, which is a doodle 
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resembling the 3-D shape of a thing, if we assume the picture embodies information 
from the thing, this would prove to be wrong in cases where there is no such a thing 
with the 3-D shape; nor is it composed by other instantiated shapes. Hopkins claims 
that such a picture does not fit Lopes’s definition of the depiction of a property. Even 
if Lopes tried to deal with this case by having recourse to his account of fictive 
pictures, the counterexample cannot be handled since it is implausible and 
unwarranted to treat every object that we do not know as fictive. The example 
threatens the notion of an information link in Lopes’s definition. 
 Hopkins then argues that a picture with pure property content points to 
problems in Lopes’s theory. The properties in such a picture are “instantiated, but do 
not depict any particular as instantiating them” (Hopkins 1997, 285). There is a 
second problem of Lopes’s theory related to pictures with pure property content: 
pictures with pure property content threaten Lopes’s bald claim that all pictures are 
transparent. For if the object in the picture with pure property content is seen, “we 
are not restricted to seeing particulars and properties instantiated by them” (Hopkins 
1997, 285). The result would be that pictures extend vision across logical barriers, 
and this is, for Hopkins, hard to accept. Hopkins contends that Lopes may modify 
the bald claim by saying that all pictures representing particulars are transparent, 
while others are not. However, this move would lead to an inability to explain the 
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twofold experience of picture viewing. Hopkins claims: “he [Lopes] tries to 
understand twofoldness as a consequence of the fact that, on the right account of 
what it is to be an object of perception, seeing a picture involves two such objects, at 
different stages in the causal chain—the surface before the viewer and the object 
from which comes the information that surface embodies” (Hopkins 1997, 285). 
Since this attempt to take the transparency of pictures is central to Lopes’s account, 
abandoning the claim that all pictures are transparent would jeopardize the 
explanation of twofoldness. However, our experience tells us that twofoldness is 
involved in both pictures that represent particulars and pictures that represent 
properties or kinds, so therefore Lopes could only choose either to insist that all 
pictures are transparent, or that some pictures fail to satisfy the twofoldness 
constraints.  
 In a later paper titled “Pictures, Phenomenology and Cognitive Science” (2003), 
Hopkins gives some new and more detailed objections to Lopes’s aspect-recognition 
theory. Hopkins formulates Lopes’s theory as “P depicts a/an F only if P is able to 
engage the ability of a suitable perceiver viewing P in suitable conditions to 
recognize a/ an F” (Hopkins 2003, 666). Hopkins claims that the meaning of the 
recognitional capacity cannot be equated to the disposition that we identify kinds of 
stimuli as a/ something F, for pictures do not engage the latter sense of the capacity. 
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This is because we can clearly identify a/ an F from a picture of a/ and F. Thus 
Hopkins reformulates the definition as follows, 
P depicts a/ an F only if there is significant overlap between the processing 
operations, whatever they are, involved in someone’s understanding P and the 
processing operations, whatever they are, involved in someone’s recognizing 
(in the flesh) a/ an F (Hopkins 2003, 667).  
The objection that Hopkins raises targets the expansionism in Lopes’s theory. 
According to Lopes, “the dimensions of variation across which pictorial recognition 
is dynamic go far beyond those across which ordinary recognition is dynamic” 
(Lopes 1996, 147). Hopkins interprets this expansionism as follows: pictures work 
by engaging our recognitional capacity across a larger variation than the 
recognitional capacity engaged by face-to-face objects. After some refinements and 
deductions, Hopkins claims that the expansionism should be understood more 
precisely as consisting in the following claim: “for some properties G, and some 
particulars or kinds, a pictures [sic] of a /an F-thing as G can engage our ability to 
recognize a/F-thing, even though were we confronted with a G-bearing such thing 
in the flesh, those recognitional capacities would not be engaged” (Hopkins 2003, 
670). If Hopkins’s formulation of the expansionism captures what Lopes means, it 
seems that Lopes’s theory fails to meet one of Hopkins’s explananda, namely that 
there are limits on pictorial misrepresentation. This is because before adopting 
expansionism, Lopes can explain the limit of misrepresentation by appealing to the 
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overlap claim—“[t]here are limits on which recognitional capacities can be jointly 
engaged by a single object seen in the flesh; and the limits on pictorial 
misrepresentation reflect these general limits on which capacities can be engaged as 
a cluster” (Hopkins 2003, 671). However, if the expansionism runs as Hopkins 
suggests the limits of misrepresentation cannot be explained because the tentative 
expansionism claims that the clusters of capacity engaged by pictures go beyond 
those engaged by objects seen face-to-face. Therefore Lopes’s theory fails to meet 
the explanandum. 
 In addition, Hopkins claims, Lopes’s aspect recognition theory also fails to 
account for another explanandum—there is no bare depiction of particulars. In order 
to meet the explanandum, the recognitional theory has to claim that recognition is 
necessarily engaged in clusters.  
Furthermore, Hopkins contends that Lopes, with the aim of explaining 
depiction in terms of pictorial understanding, pushes the recognition of things into 
consciousness, since understanding pictures is a conscious response to them 
(Hopkins 2003, 672). Lopes claims, then, that “recognizing a feature entails having a 
conscious experience of that feature” (Lopes 2003, 648). However, Hopkins holds 
that the recognition capacity of some creatures is not engaged in clusters, and those 
creatures may only recognize particulars without recognizing them as having any 
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features, for the recognition of the features is triggered at the sub-personal level. 
What Hopkins is arguing is that “it is possible for the ability consciously to 
recognize a particular to be engaged without any other abilities for conscious 
recognition being so. If so, there could be pictures which engage the ability to 
recognize a particular without engaging any other recognitional abilities” (Hopkins 
2003, 672).  
In response, Lopes raises the example of pictorial blindsight. This is a thought 
experiment in which someone can “sense”, but could not see, the depicted objects, 
and remains unaware of the features of the object depicted while being capable of 
giving reliable answers about questions about this very content (Lopes 2003, 648). 
Lopes uses this example to argue that recognition of things is not necessarily 
conscious; there can be recognition in sub-conscious level. Thus, the example shows 
that recognition engaged in cluster does not necessarily rise to a conscious level. 
However, Hopkins argues that Lopes’s example of pictorial blindsight further 
confirms Hopkins’s criticisms of the aspect-recognition theory. Hopkins argues that 
in the example, the recognition of the object depicted is a conscious recognition of 
the picture’s content, and since the perceiver in the example can only identify the 
object depicted without stating any features of the object, the example is clear 
enough to show that Lopes’s theory allows bare depiction of particulars. Lopes can 
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defend the theory by saying that the recognition involved is not a conscious mental 
event. Nonetheless, Hopkins holds that a case of this sort would not be a matter of 
depiction since no representation can be formed at such a ‘deep’ level: “nothing 
buried so deep in our inner workings could constitute a form of representation, in 
the sense in which language, pictures and other external symbols all represent…” 
(Hopkins 2003, 673). Therefore, Hopkins claims, Lopes’s account also fails to meet 
another explanandum—there is no bare depiction of a particular. 
 In a more recent essay entitled “The Speaking Image: Visual Communication 
and the Nature of Depiction” (Hopkins 2006, 145-159), Hopkins raises other 
criticisms of Lopes’s theory. He questions the explanatory power of Lopes’s theory 
and suggests that there are two claims in the general formulation of the recognition 
theory. First, one can only recognize an object in a picture if and only if one can 
recognize that object face-to-face. This claim concerns, in Schier’s term, the 
“co-variance” between our ability to interpret pictures and our ability to recognize 
objects in person. The second claim, inferred from the first, is that “whatever 
subpersonal processing is involved in recognizing the object in the flesh, 
significantly overlapping processing is involved in understanding a depiction of that 
object” (Hopkins 2006, 155). This claim concerns the overlap and the “co-variance”, 
between the two sorts of cognitive and perceptual capacities. In addition, a 
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recognition theory should be able to account for distinguishing recognition of an 
object in a picture from recognition of the object in the fresh. 
With these remarks in place, Hopkins criticizes Lopes’s account for saying nothing 
concrete about the differences between the processes of recognizing objects directly 
and recognizing them in visual representations. Hopkins contends that although 
Lopes might try to account for such differences with his talk of two-dimensional and 
three-dimensional recognition, this approach is unsatisfactory since it is not the 
recognition theory that is doing the explanation, but rather claims that can be 
attached to almost any position in the philosophy of depiction. Hopkins further 
explores some of Lopes’s possible moves. Lopes might, Hopkins claims, solve the 
problem by adjusting the overlap claim by saying “what pictures engage is not 
merely our ability to recognize O in the flesh, but our ability to recognize O “seen 
two-dimensionally.” Sculptures, in contrast, engage our ability to recognize O when 
presented in three dimensions” (Hopkins 2006, 157). However, the resulting 
adjustment either means, “(1) that we identify a representation as of O, and that 
representation is two-dimensional; or it means (2) that what we are seeing is O in 
two-dimensional form, and we recognize it as such” (ibid). However, both readings 
are unsatisfactory, for (1) is an uncontroversial claim that we are capable of 
understanding pictures, and it leads us back to the same way that we handle the 
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distinction by adding extra claims. And (2), claims Hopkins, is certainly false (ibid).
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CHAPTER SIX 
CRITIQUES OF THE EXPERIENCED RESEMBLANCE THEORY  
IN OUTLINE SHAPE 
 
In this chapter, I survey the criticisms of Hopins’s theory of experienced 
resemblance presented by Gabriela Sakamoto, Catherine Abell, and Dominic Lopes.  
 
An Objection from Gabriela Sakamoto 
As was established above, the experienced resemblance theory appeals not only 
to the viewers’ competence at seeing resemblances in outline shape, but also to 
knowledge of what sort of objects the world contains, knowledge of how things are 
generally depicted, and knowledge of the various means of pictorial depiction. In his 
book review of Picture, Image and Experience, Sakamoto criticizes that this 
requirement of possessing knowledge of the world and the artistic conventions on 
the grounds that such a position opens the door to the objection that the theory does 
no real explanatory work (Sakamoto 2002, 93). If what Gombrich and Goodman 
claim—our experience of pictures is the function of our beliefs about how the world 
is structured—is correct, then it is our beliefs, and not resemblance, that explain our 
experience of pictures as possessing particular contents. Therefore, experienced 
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resemblance may merely be the product of depiction, not what really explains the 
phenomenon. 
 
Objections from Catherine Abell 
In her paper entitled “On Outlining the Shape of Depiction”, Catherine Abell 
raises two criticisms of Hopkins’s theory of experienced resemblance. Her first 
contention is that the notion of outline shape is inconsistent, and her second point is 
that the theory fails to establish that the determinacy of properties of 3-D shape is a 
result of the determinacy of outline shape. 
 Abell argues that the notion of outline shape is not purely geometrical but 
partially visual, and that this entails that either the account is inconsistent, or that 
outline shape is equivalent to the silhouette of objects. Hopkins asserts that outline 
shape is a geometrical notion: outline shape is the solid angle subtended by the 
surface of the object to a point; thus change of outline shape would only take place 
as a result of an alternation in the 3-D shape or changes of the orientation of the 
object (Hopkins 1998, 114). Hence, if outline shape is a purely geometrical notion, 
surface patterning would not affect the outline shape of an object. However, Hopkins 
claims in discussing an example that “outline shape is sensitive to the position of 
boundaries between areas of differing colour, if not to the particular colour those 
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areas are. Thus the outline shape of a zebra differs from that of a small horse, even if 
the only visible difference between the two lies in the former having stripes which 
the latter lacks” (Hopkins 1998, 85 footnote). Following what Hopkins says, outline 
shape is partially a visual notion since it is sensitive to boundaries between areas of 
colours. Changing the outline shape of an object by changing the pattern on its 
surface does not involve alternations of its 3-D shape or its orientation. Therefore 
Hopkins is inconsistent with regard to his elucidation of the notion of outline shape. 
Furthermore, Abell argues that Hopkins’s inconsistency leads to a serious dilemma 
with regard to the notion of outline shape. The dilemma is confronted with regard to 
the problem of explaining how outline shapes can be nested in bigger outline shapes, 
and why the 3-D shape and the orientation of an object depicted are always 
reasonably determinate. In order to overcome the inconsistency, Hopkins can hold 
that surface patterning does not affect outline shapes. However, Abell argues, such 
insistence cannot explain the outline shape of an object containing nested smaller 
outline shapes since “it is only in virtue of surface patterning on the tracing of the 
pyramid that the solid angle it subtends comprises the solid angles subtended by two 
distinct parts” (Abell 2005, 34). If nested outline shape is not possible, the outline 
shape is equivalent to the silhouette of the object. Another solution that Hopkins can 
opt for—which for Abell constitutes the other horn of the dilemma—is that outline 
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shape is dependent on surface patterning; an outline shape is affected by the 3-D 
shape, orientation, as well as the surface patterning of the object. However, Abell 
asserts, claiming that outline shape is correlated with surface patterning is not an 
option for Hopkins since “this would not be sufficient to explain why the three 
dimensional shapes and orientations objects are depicted as having are always 
reasonably determinate” (Abell 2005, 32). Nonetheless, Abell has not elaborated 
why correlating surface patterning to outline shape would be insufficient to explain 
the determinacy of 3-D shape and orientation of the object depicted.  
 The second objection that Abell makes is that the theory fails to establish that 
the determinacy of properties of 3-D shape is a result of the determinacy of outline 
shape. According to Hopkins, since most human beings see with two eyes, the 
outline shapes relative to each of the two eyes are slightly different. Therefore 
general vision only achieves a certain level of determinacy, and such a limit of 
determinacy is the limit of determinacy of experienced outline shape. However, 
Abell argues that according to David Marr, the process of stereopsis—the process of 
visual perception that causes the depth effect by two slightly different images 
formed on the retinas of the two eyes—leads to the result that the more the eyes 
move in relation to an object, the more determinate the 3-D shape of the object is 
(Abell 2005, 36). Abell argues that the more the eyes move in relation to an object, 
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the less determinate the outline shape of the object is. The determinacy of outline 
shape decreases while the determinacy of 3-D shape increases, and “outline shape 
will be at its most determinate when three-dimensional shape is at its least 
determinate, and vice versa” (Abell 2005, 36). This shows that the perception of the 
3-D shape of an object does not correlate with the perception of its outline shape, 
which leads to the conclusion that when our eyes move during the process of visual 
perception, we see things with increasingly determinate 3-D shape and at the same 
time with decreasingly determinate outline shape. Abell argues that given this result, 
the notion of outline shape can hardly be recognized as a general feature of visual 
experience.  
 
Objections from Dominic Lopes 
In his article “Pictures and the Representational Mind” (2003), Lopes raises 
some objections to the experienced resemblance theory. His first objection is a 
general objection to all theories that take seeing-in as central. Since Hopkins’s 
theory takes seeing-in as a central component that necessarily involves a twofold 
experience, namely, seeing the object depicted and the surface of the picture 
simultaneously, some pictures, namely trompe-l’œil pictures, are excluded by the 
theory as representing their subject pictorially. Lopes claims that it is the domination 
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of the “object-presenting aspect” and the suppression of the awareness of the surface 
of pictures that makes such kind of pictures trompe-l’œil pictures (Lopes 2003, 636). 
Therefore, either seeing-in fails to account for trompe-l’œil pictures as pictures, or 
we have to say that these pictures do not represent pictorially. 
Lopes’s second objection is about the application of concepts to our visual 
experience of viewing pictures. Hopkins contends that seeing the similarity of 
outline shape in a picture “forces from us” the application of a concept. Thus we see 
what the depicted object is. However, he argues that the question of why the 
application of the concepts is forced by the experience should not be explained in 
the realm of philosophy but psychology or other relevant disciplines. Lopes objects 
that this line of thought makes one wonder whether experienced resemblance of 
outline shape is necessary for seeing-in, and eventually, for depiction, since there are 
examples that show that experienced resemblance of outline shape is not necessary 
for depiction: a technical drawing of a rectangular table is not experienced as 
resembling the shape of a rectangular table; nor is Picasso’s portrait of Gertrude 
Stein is experienced as resembling the outline shape of the real Gertrude Stein. 
Lopes argues that it is possible that merely the experiences of viewing the pictures 
elicits the application of concepts, and experienced resemblance in outline shape is 
not necessary for the application of concepts (Lopes 2003, 639-640). 
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Replies by Hopkins 
Hopkins treats Lopes’s criticisms as requiring him to commit to an answer to 
the question about the causation of depiction, which Hopkins has tried not to answer 
that question and explicitly leaves it to psychology and other disciplines. In reply to 
the counterexamples that Lopes raises, which are Picasso’s portrait of Gertrude Stein 
and the technical drawing of a rectangular table, Hopkins argues that sometimes the 
experience of seeing-in is not a perfect guide to the content of a picture—what we 
see in a picture is not sufficient for determining what the picture depicts. 
 In order to be insulated from potential counter examples, Hopkins makes three 
points in response to Lopes’s general criticism, which argues that Hopkins’s theory 
commits him to addressing the causal theory in depiction in order to explain why a 
particular surface pattern elicits the experienced resemblance in outline shape 
(Hopkins 2003, 663-664). First, Hopkins argues that if a picture is not experienced 
in the way he has argued, appealing to a causal theory that would explain how a 
particular surface causes that experience would not help to make the theory right. 
Second, Hopkins argues that he can appeal to a causal theory in discussing the 
particular cases in hand if appealing to a causal theory really helps to defend his 
constitutive theory of depiction. He would not be committed to any general claims 
about what is required for a concept application that generates experiences of 
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seeing-in not to mention a general claim about concept application in visual 
experience. Third, Hopkins argues that even if he makes general claims to the effect 
that concept application is triggered by perceiving outline shapes in pictures, 
Lopes’s objection, which argues that objects and members of kinds are visually 
identified by their outline shapes, fails, since the application of concepts in cases of 
depiction and cases of face-to-face recognition could be different: “even if I did tell 
a general causal story about seeing-in, it need have no consequences for seeing 
generally……For it could be that different factors trigger the application of the 
concept in the pictorial and face-to-face cases” (Hopkins 2003a, 664). 
 
More Objections from Lopes 
In a more recent article “The Domain of Depiction”, Lopes raises his objections 
to Hopkins by bringing in additional examples. Lopes’s first objection is a 
continuation of the previously discussed objection. The example is a cube that is 
drawn under the parallel oblique perspective, and Lopes uses the example to show 
that experienced resemblance in outline shape is not necessary for depiction. Since 
the picture does not show us what a cube usually looks like, but, intuitively, one 
does see a cube in the picture, Lopes argues that Hopkins can either claim that the 
picture does not depict a cube (it can be a misrepresentation of a cube, or merely a 
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hexahedron), or it does depict a cube although the cube in the picture does not share 
objective similarity in outline shape with a cube. Both replies are problematic 
because the first reply would categorize a lot of pictures as misrepresentations and 
the second reply would detach experienced resemblance in outline shape from 
objective similarity in outline shape (Lopes 2006, 165).  
 Lopes then uses the second example to argue that experienced resemblance in 
outline shape is not sufficient for seeing-in. The example is three pictures that are 
identical except that they differ in shading. Although these three pictures share 
objective resemblance in outline shape, the easiness of identifying a face in these 
pictures varies: (a) shows the outline of positive shading of a face, (b) shows the 
outline in negative shading, and (c) shows the outline with no shading (Lopes 2006, 
166). Similar to the last example of the cube, Lopes contends that Hopkins can opt 
for either (c) depicts a face, and our intuition is wrong that we do not see a face in it, 
or a face is not seen in (c) since there is no similarity in outline shape experienced, 
although (c) shares objective resemblance in outline shape with (a) and (b). The 
problem of the first response is that any object has nearly infinite numbers of outline 
shape, and there could be pictures matching these outline shapes; however, we are 
not able to identify the objects in all these pictures because there are cases like (c) 
among the pictures. Sometimes even the picture matches a particular outline shape 
137 
 
of the object, yet it depicts nothing since viewers cannot identify the object. If the 
theory argues that our intuitions that those pictures depict because they match the 
outline shape of the object is wrong, then our intuitions “have been pushed too far” 
(Lopes 2006, 167). The problem of the second response is that detaching 
experienced resemblance in outline shape from objective resemblance in outline 
allows idiosyncratic experiences that lack a standard of correctness.  
 Finally, the Invisible Dalmatian is used by Lopes as an example to argues that it 
is difficult to prove that experienced resemblance in outline shape explains depiction. 
According to Lopes, seeing the outline shape of the dog depends on first seeing a 
dog in the picture, and this is what psychologists called a “subjective contour”. If the 
outline shape of the dog is only seen after one sees a dog in the picture, then 
experienced resemblance in outline shape does not explain depiction. Instead, such 
an experience is a product of depiction.  
 In light of these criticisms, Lopes argues that experienced resemblance in 
outline shape is neither necessary nor sufficient for seeing-in, and hence for 
depiction. And the theory fails to sidestep Goodman’s challenge—resemblance, 
whether objective or experiential, has to be shown to explain depiction, rather than 
be the production of depiction.  
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Replies by Hopkins 
Although Hopkins does not address himself specifically to all of Lopes’s 
critiques, in a chapter belonged to the same anthology as Lopes’s article “The 
Domain of Depiction”, he makes six related points (Hopkins 2006, 152-154). First, 
the experienced resemblance theory is not a theory of how pictures should be made, 
but rather states a condition under which the resulting image depicts an object: 
namely, there is depiction only if the marks are experienced as resembling the object. 
Second, the marks will be experienced as resembling an object if the picture depicts 
the object. For example, if a picture depicts a deformed Tony Blair, the marks on the 
picture surface are experienced as resembling in outline shape a deformed Blair. 
Third, objects can be depicted imprecisely. When a picture depicts an object with 
certain indeterminacy, a “good deal of variation” of the marks is allowed for the 
picture to depict the object since the marks “share the relevant rough outline shape” 
(Hopkins 2006, 153). Fourth, although resemblance of the picture and the outline 
shape of an object, and the experienced resemblance of the picture and the outline 
shape of the object, always come together, the former is neither necessary nor 
sufficient for the latter. Fifth, there are many factors affecting our experience of 
resemblance in outline shape in pictures. Sixth, not everything seen in a picture is 
what the picture depicts. Seeing-in is necessary, but not sufficient, for depiction. For 
139 
 
example, one sees a man with a deformed shape, but such a stick-figure depicts a 
man with certain indeterminacy, not a man with a deformed shape.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN  
MY CRITICISMS OF THE ASPECT-RECOGNITION THEORY 
 
 In this section, I lay out my criticisms of the aspect-recognition theory. As I 
have shown, criticisms of the aspect-recognition theory from various philosophers 
can be categorized into criticisms concerning several distinct features of the theory. 
My critiques concern, first, what counts as the source of a piece of information; 
second, the nature of information; and third, the bold claim that all pictures are 
transparent.  
 Lopes explicitly states that his theory is based on Gareth Evans’s notion of an 
information system. In such systems, humans are “gatherers, storers and transmitters 
of information” (Lopes 1996, 102). One derives information from an object by 
having perceptual contact with it; the object is the source of the information we 
derive. The source is the input to the information system, and a piece of information 
is always “of” whatever object is the source, no matter whether the system is reliable 
or not. If a system is reliable, the content of an information state matches the 
properties of its source; if a system is unreliable, the content of an information state 
is garbled, and does not match its source.  
 However, Lopes takes the notion of information as given, and does not discuss 
this notion in detail. According to Godfrey-Smith, there are two senses of 
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‘information’ (Godfrey-Smith 2007), one is a mathematical notion proposed by 
Claude Shannon, and another one is a stronger notion proposed by Fred Dretske. 
The weaker notion of information is initially used for communication technology to 
quantify the number of alternatives of the source that might be realized in particular 
occasions (Godfrey-Smith 2007, 106). This notion of information only concerns 
contingent correlations. In Shannon’s sense, when one says that A contains 
information about B, one is saying no more than “there is an informational 
connection between smoke and fire, or between tree rings and a tree’s age” (ibid). 
The stronger notion of information, which is also called ‘semantic’ or ‘intentional’ 
information, is more controversial. Dretske’s notion of semantic information refers 
to information-bearing signals which exists objectively and are caused by states of 
the world. One important distinction between these two notions of information is 
that Shannnon’s notion of information does not have the capacity to account for 
misrepresentation, while Dretske’s allows for both accurate and inaccurate 
representations. Since misrepresentation is possible in pictorial representation, the 
notion of information that Lopes and Evans adopt must be a semantic one, like 
Dretske’s notion. In the book upon which Lopes builds his theory of depiction, 
Evans only briefly mentions information as follows:  
Our particular-thoughts [sic] are very often based upon information which we 
have about the world. We take ourselves to be informed, in whatever way, of 
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the existence of such-and such an object, and we think or speculate about it. A 
thought of the kind with which I am concerned is governed by a conception of 
its object which is the result of neither of fancy…nor of linguistic stipulation…, 
but rather is the result of a belief about how the world is which the subject has 
because he has received information (or misinformation) from the object. 
(Evans 1982, 121) 
In the above passage, it is obvious that Evans adopts the notion of information as 
reference to states of the world. This explains why information states can possibly 
be belief-independent and non-conceptual, since our beliefs do not change states of 
the world, and we do not always have concepts of them. It is also obvious that Evans 
has recourse to a semantic conception of information, since he refers explicitly to 
‘misinformation’ and hence misrepresentation. 
 
Objections to the Source of information 
However, Lopes’s adaptation of information as indicators of particular states of 
the world raises questions. For example, one may derive information of a lake from 
a painting of the lake, or from a photograph of the lake, or from the lake directly. 
With the idea of information transmission in mind, one may wonder about the 
differences between the sources of the information among these three cases. The 
information is about a particular state of the world—the lake. One has perceptual 
contact with the lake in the last case, but how about the first and the second cases? 
There is no doubt that one has perceptual contact with the painting and the 
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photograph, but does one have perceptual contact with the lake through viewing the 
picture or the photograph? Lopes may reply that one can have perceptual connection 
with the lake via viewing of the pictures because, as this is what the bold claim 
asserts, all figurative pictures are transparent—meaning one can literarily see the 
objects depicted in pictures. Therefore one derives information from a particular 
state of the world by having perceptual contact with the source. However, the bold 
claim that all figurative pictures are transparent is something Lopes wishes to prove, 
and it is extremely controversial. My objection to the claim will be raised in the 
latter part of this section. In the meanwhile, for the sake of the argument, let’s 
assume that claim is correct.  
 Even if the bold claim were right, having perceptual contact with the source 
would not be the only and necessary way of determining the source of the 
information, since having perceptual contact is not necessary for determining the 
source of the information. Lopes admits that there are some cases where we cannot 
have perceptual contact with the object represented—for example, when what a 
picture depicts is fictive (Lopes 1996, 202). A fictional picture is an actual picture 
that depicts objects that do not exist. Lopes recruits Walton’s notion of make-believe 
to try to solve the problem of how such fictive pictures refer. On such an account, a 
fictive picture refers by fictive reference. Since one cannot have perceptual contact 
144 
 
with things that do not exist, having perceptual contact with the object depicted is 
not necessary for determining the source of the information. In cases of fictive 
pictures, one determines the imaginary source of the picture by recognition.  
With fictive pictures as one kind of example, there are special cases where a 
piece of information does not have a source, or it is wrongly recognized as arising 
from other sources. Evans claims that there are four cases of ill-groundedness 
(Evans 1982, 132-133). The first and the second kind of cases are the results of 
garbling and distortion of information. The first kind of case refers to information 
that has a source, but cannot be identified by the purported mode of identification. 
The second kind refers to information that has a source, but is wrongly identified as 
something else. The third case and the fourth case refer to information that do not 
have a source, but is identified as, for the third case, coming from a source; or, for 
the fourth case, information that remains unidentified. 
The main defect of Lopes’s account of depiction is that it fails to determine the 
source of misrepresentational information and information embodied in fictive 
pictures. Misrepresentation is commonly known as a representation ascribing non-G 
properties to G. Adopting the idea that human beings are gatherers, storers, and 
transmitters of information in the pictorial system, misrepresentational information 
may due to garbling and distortion of information within the system. For example, 
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one may ‘store’ the information of the lake in memory, and later, due to the 
degradation of memory, paint a painting of the lake with properties that the lake 
does not possess. However, such kinds of distortion can be sub-conscious or 
intentional. One may ascribe to the lake properties that the lake does not possess in 
order to express one’s ideas or feelings. The resulting painting may be wrongly 
identified as of other lakes, or it cannot be identified as of any lakes at all. Therefore 
this example belongs to the second and third kind of ill-groundedness of information. 
An interesting question is what the source of information of such a painting is. 
Lopes may reply that although it is the result of garbled information of the lake, the 
lake is the source of the information embodied in the painting. However, let’s 
assume that the properties ascribed to the lake that it does not really enjoy are 
actually drawn from my experience of many visits to the most beautiful lakes around 
the world. Therefore all of the additional properties ascribed to the lake indeed have 
a source, and the proportion between the information from the lake and from the 
memory of other lakes is the same in the resulting painting. It seems that given that 
it is unacceptable to admit that the painting has multiple (primary) sources, such an 
example counts as a serious counterexample to his theory. The example can be 
further developed by allowing that some properties ascribed to the painting are 
indeed imaginary. Then the information embodied in the resulting painting would 
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have no source and multiple sources at the same time. This is absurd. A better way, 
and a crucial way, to describe the example would be that the painting has multiple 
sources: one source of the imaginary properties ascribed is the mental states of the 
painter. Since information is about particular states of the world, and if one accepts 
that having a particular mental state is a particular state of the world, then 
information can be of a particular mental state; hence a particular mental state can be 
the source of information—in the sense of content. 
In light of these considerations, we can say that Lopes’s adaptation of the 
notion of information as indicators of particular states of the world is ambiguous and 
even confused. Lopes’s account cannot explain misrepresentation unless it is 
accepted that particular mental states are also sources of information. In what 
follows, I will turn to my other objections to the nature of information in Lopes’s 
theory. 
 
The Nature of Information 
Recall the three cases of deriving information of a lake by viewing a painting, a 
photograph, and the lake directly. What is the difference between these three 
situations in terms of information? Lopes would reply that the information conveyed 
by the painting and the photograph are aspectually-structured and essentially 
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explicitly non-committal (see chapter 3). Nonetheless, Lopes never explicitly 
explains how information can be structured as explicitly non-committal; it is 
possible that information is structured this way according to the painter’s intentions 
and beliefs, or other attitudes, or again, in cases where the picture results from a 
mechanical or automatic process, the committal arises from some sorts of 
non-agential causal events. However, in the case of deriving information of the 
scene in person directly, the information one derives is also explicitly non-committal. 
For example, Tom, who sees a sign board blocking the head of a duck in the scene, 
finds it interesting and takes a photograph of it, and let’s assume that what the 
photograph shows is actually what Tom saw. If one says that the information 
conveyed by the photo is explicitly non-committal about what is behind the sign 
board, then the information derived from the scene directly is also explicitly 
non-committal about what was behind the sign board.  
 Indeed, Lopes’s idea that the specificity of pictorial representation resides in its 
explicitly non-committal structure has been objected to that on the ground that 
explicitly non-committal structure exists in other kinds of representations9. However, 
following the argument in the previous paragraph concerning the problem of 
distinguish pictorial representation from other forms of representation, Lopes’s 
 
9 Refer to the summary of criticisms of Lopes’s account in Chapter five. 
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account also fails to distinguish pictorial representation from direct perception, or in 
other words, ‘presentation’.  
 However, it is possible that Lopes intends to equate information derived from 
the scene directly to information derived from a viewing of the painting, since with 
information derived from a picture, one recognizes the subject of the picture, which 
is also the source of the information. Lopes may claim that the scene and the 
painting indeed convey the same information of the scene, and it is the recognitional 
capacity that distinguishes whether one is of a flat surface and one is from the scene 
directly. In “The Domain of Depiction”, Lopes claims: “Whereas sculptural 
recognition only requires the triggering of an ability to recognize the represented 
object in three dimensions, pictorial recognition involves the triggering of an ability 
to recognize the represented object seen two-dimensionally” (Lopes 2006, 172). 
However, it is problematic to postulate the cause of differences from viewing the 
scene from the picture and from the scene directly to recognition. Since recognition 
is a kind of causal reaction based on the stimuli received, if the information of the 
lake received from a picture and that from the scene is the same, then the result of 
recognition should be the same. In reply to this critique, Lopes may claim that the 
process of face-to-face recognition is different, although they overlap to a large 
extent. However, according to Lopes, both face-to-face recognition and pictorial 
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recognition are based on the same recognitional capacity that human beings possess; 
if the two recognitional processes are different, Lopes has to account for the cause of 
the differences. However, Lopes cannot without contradiction appeal to a claim that 
there are differences in the information derived; or contend that the recognitional 
processes are based on different capacities. 
 In spite of the inability to distinguish information derived from the object 
directly and from representations of the object, Lopes’s notion of information is 
ambiguous when it is conjoined with the idea of aspectual pictorial system. Another 
objection hinges on a claim about a hidden consequence of Lopes’s theory that it 
would be unwise for him to accept, namely, that all pictures are necessarily 
misrepresentations. How did this intuitively unacceptable idea follow from Lopes’s 
assertions? According to Lopes, information is embedded in pictures aspectually, 
meaning that information is structured committally, explicitly non-committally, and 
inexplicitly non-committally. Lopes claims that it is the explicitly non-committal 
structured information that distinguishes pictorial representation from other kinds of 
representation (see chapter 3). It is worth nothing that the pictorial aspect of a 
picture is the result of processes of selectivity, and pictorial aspects are not only 
spatial, but also include other properties such as texture and colour. According to 
Lopes, every picture is necessarily explicitly non-committal in some respects: when 
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some properties are represented, some others are ruled out. A piece of information 
can be structurally embedded in different pictorial aspects. For example, I use Tom 
as the model for my paintings that are drawn in different styles, such as surrealism 
and cubism. I also take photographs, including both colour and black-and-white 
photographs, of Tom. My first question is whether the information embodied in 
these pictorial aspects is the same. Although a suitable perceiver may be able to 
recognize Tom in all these pictures, the information is not the same due to the fact 
that they are structured differently. The information is explicitly non-committally 
structured in different pictorial styles, different relations or properties of the 
information are selected to be represented or precluded. It is then obvious that the 
information embodied in pictures with different styles is indeed different: different 
relations and properties are represented, and precluded.  
Although pictures of the same object in different pictorial styles contain 
different information, a suitable perceiver can still recognize the object in these 
pictures. The perceiver can still recognize the object probably because there are 
similarities between the information ‘contained’ in these different representations. 
However, as we have seen, having perceptual contact with the source of the 
information is not necessary for identification of the source; the viable option left 
open is to appeal to recognition. It is vital for Lopes to identify the commonality of 
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the information in different pictorial styles, since it is this common information that 
according to his theory, must perform the crucial function of triggering the same 
recognitional ability. However, Lopes does not offer any possible solution except by 
invoking the recognitional based identification of the source of the information. Yet 
appealing to recognitional based identification is not viable. Here’s why: if Lopes 
claims that one can recognize the object from different pictorial aspects because one 
can identify the source of the information in the pictures by means of recognition, he 
is moving in a circular manner. Therefore unless Lopes gives a more detailed and 
explicit account of the nature of information, he is analyzing the notion of depiction 
in terms of recognition and not information.  
Furthermore, the notion of pictorial aspects leads to the consequence that all 
pictures are necessarily misrepresentation. When information is aspectually 
structured, some relations and properties of the object are precluded, and this would 
result in a loss of information, as well as in the ascription of relations and properties 
that the object does not really enjoy. Therefore, given Lopes’s notion of information, 
the aspectually structured information is misinformation, and all pictures are 
necessarily misrepresentations. For example, a cubist painting of my neighbor, Tom, 
would represent Tom as having a segmented face; or choosing to shoot a photograph 
portrait of Tom in black-and-white would represent Tom in gray scale. Thus 
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structuring information in various pictorial aspects is indeed a process of garbling 
and distortion of information, and all pictures are misrepresentation of their objects, 
given Lopes’s account. Since I have shown that Lopes’s account is inadequate in 
explaining misrepresentational pictures, and if all pictures are misrepresentational, 
then Lopes’s account fails to account for all pictures. 
 
Objections to the Bold Claim 
Lopes’s main argument for the bold claim—all pictures are transparent—is 
based on one assumption: the production of pictures and the recognition of depicted 
objects are non-conceptual. Lopes holds that a concept is a basic constituent of 
belief. It follows that if perceptual and recognitional processes are non-conceptual, 
then they are all belief-independent. According to Lopes, “A content is conceptual if 
in grasping or experiencing it one must possess concepts of the properties it 
represents the world as having. If one need not possess concepts of these properties, 
then the content is non-conceptual” (Lopes 1996, 185). However, non-conceptual 
mental content is a controversial notion in contemporary debates of perception and 
epistemology, and Lopes’s taking this notion for granted looks rash. There are 
philosophers who disagree with the idea that recognitional capacity is 
non-conceptual. For example, John McDowell (1994) argues that recognitional 
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capacity is fully conceptual.  
Furthermore, Lopes’s treatment of ‘concept’ requires a more detailed 
explanation. One example provided by Lopes is that seeing a rainbow does not 
require the viewer to possess concepts of every light in the rainbow or wavelengths 
of light, therefore, seeing a rainbow is non-conceptual. With such a definition of 
conceptuality, human beings seldom possess concepts of things in their everyday life. 
When one looks at a lake, one does not know when the lake was formed, the name 
of the lake, or how deep the lake is; people from ancient times did not have any 
knowledge that a lake is full of water, at least if that means the substance consisting 
of H2O. However, one can still plan on swimming in the lake, and people from 
ancient times could still live and had various activities with beliefs about the lake. 
Lopes should first have discussed what the criteria are in order for one to have a 
concept. On the basis of his remarks, it seems fair to say that he works with an 
ambiguous and overly narrow notion of concepts.  
   Even if we granted that recognition were non-conceptual, drawing is 
hardly non-conceptual. Lopes claims that drawing, or painting, is merely an 
application of the recognitional capacity. One does not need to possess the concept 
of what one draws, but only to ensure that the resulting images are recognizable as 
of the object. Nonetheless, drawing and painting are results of a series of complex 
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mental activities and conscious decisions. Structuring information, which is stored 
as memory, into various pictorial aspects requires decisions about what properties 
should be represented and what properties should be precluded. Drawing is always a 
process of attributing properties to the represented objects. When various properties 
are attributed to the objects, the drawer would consider what effects the picture 
conveys; amendment is always a vital process during the creation of a picture in 
order to achieve intended effects. Drawing or painting is not only a matter of 
recognition, but creation according to the creator’s intention. It sounds absurd to 
suggest that the creator intentionally attributes properties to his drawing without 
relying upon any concepts of those properties. 
 Given the arguments introduced, it follows that Lopes needs to provide more 
detail about the nature of information and discussion of non-conceptual content 
before his account of aspect-recognition theory is viable, which means ultimate that 
his theory of depiction rests on shaky foundations. Indeed, the word ‘information’ is 
now often used in various disciplines, like biology and cognitive science, though it 
should be recognized that much of this usage is highly metaphorical and the subject 
of serious controversy. Godfrey-Smith suggests that the Dretskean notion of 
information, at least in the realm of biology, is at best a metaphorical linguistic 
description (Godfrey-Smith 2007, 114-118). It might be wisest to acknowledge that 
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a similar conclusion should be drawn with regard to usage of ‘information’ in 
philosophies of depiction. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
MY CRITICISMS OF THE EXPERIENCED RESEMBLANCE THEORY 
 
 In this chapter, I raise my criticisms of Hopkins’s experienced resemblance 
theory. In chapter six, I have shown that the major criticisms of the theory are made 
by Catherine Abell and Dominic Lopes. I shall elaborate in particular on some of the 
criticisms advanced by Lopes. 
 
 Can Photographs Depict? 
 The first objection that I want to raise is that in Hopkins’s discussion, he 
distinguishes two types of standard of correctness—one based on intention, and the 
second based on causal relations. By ‘causal relations’ Hopkins means mechanical 
process like the process whereby a photograph is taken. For the causally established 
standard of correctness, misrepresentation is impossible since the camera only 
captures what is visible in front of it. In the case of the intentional standard of 
correctness, misrepresentation is possible since the creator can intentionally attribute 
properties to the represented object that it does not really enjoy. Someone may argue 
that misrepresentation is possible even in photographs since darkroom 
manipulations, which have a long tradition going back to the very invention of 
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photography, can result in pictures that attribute properties to the object that it does 
not really have. However, darkroom manipulations involve the intentions of the 
person who develops the film and fixes the image, and these are not part of the sort 
of purely mechanical process Hopkins talks about. (The sort of mechanical process 
that Hopkins evokes would seem to be approximated more closely by the example 
of Polaroid cameras with instantly processing film. Such a mechanical captures and 
displays only what is in front of the camera and are in some sense ‘incorrigible’.) 
The question is: since the fourth explanandum claims that misrepresentation is 
possible in depiction, can photograph depict? Hopkins argues that: 
That [fourth] explanandum concerns a form of representation, depiction. So 
there is no tension between it and the claim that a certain set of pictures are 
incorrigible, and necessarily so. To generate an inconsistency here, we would at 
the least have to claim that depiction by photograph forms a distinctive kind of 
representation. That is not something we have claimed. Furthermore, even if we 
did so, that form of representation would differ from non-photographic 
depiction only in failing to fit (X4). The other five explananda would hold of it, 
and thus there would still be ample ties of kinship between the two (Hopkins 
1998, 75).  
The answer to the question whether photographs depict remains obscure in 
Hopkins’s statement. Of course not all pictures depict, abstract paintings are an 
obvious example. However, Hopkins claims that the six explananda determine what 
depict, and since photography fails to match one explanandum, it follows that 
photographs do not depict. Hopkins’s saying that there is no tension between 
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photography’s incorrigibility and (X4) implies that photography does not depict, and 
it represents by other means. Although Hopkins does not claim that explicitly, it is 
just simply logically impossible for photography to depict and fail (X4) at the same 
time. However, it is counter-intuitive to say that photographs do not depict, and we 
may concede that our intuition is wrong about this. An alternative for Hopkins is to 
claim that photography depicts, although it only fits five explananda. However, 
doing do would leave the six explananda as merely guidelines rather than necessary 
conditions for theories of depiction. Furthermore, if a mechanical causal relation 
counts as standard of correctness, and photographs depict, it is questionable whether 
other kinds of causal relation can also be counted as a standard of correctness, as 
mechanical causal relations can vary in complexity. The next question would be 
whether some kind of causal relation, in spite of mechanical causal relation, can also 
be counted as standard of correctness? If the answer is yes, then it seems all marks 
on a surface that trigger the experienced resemblance in outline shape would depict; 
if the answer is no, then it would be important to discuss why some complex 
mechanical causal relation has the privilege. 
 
Experienced Resemblance 
 In his book Picture, Image and Experience, Hopkins argues that there are three 
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problems for the resemblance theory (11-12). First, resemblance is a relation 
between at least two particulars. However, pictures often depict general kinds of 
things. Second, resemblance must be resemblance in particular aspects, but not 
merely resemblance alone. However, when one has to state in what aspect(s) two 
things resemble, differences are always easy to find. Third, there are various 
pictorial styles, and it is unconvincing to claim that resemblance between the object 
and pictures of different styles are the same.  
 The proposal of experienced resemblance theory in outline shape aims at 
overcoming these (and other) problems encountered by resemblance theories. The 
problems the Hopkins proposal creates are no less than those it solves. In order for 
the experienced resemblance theory to be viable, Hopkins has to explain the nature 
of ‘experienced resemblance in outline shape’. The notion of outline shape is 
introduced by Hopkins in detail. However, Hopkins does not talk much about the 
notion of experienced resemblance. He simply take the notion of experienced 
resemblance as given. Maybe Hopkins is right that experience is simply experience. 
What more can be said about it? Nonetheless, this vagueness of the notion makes the 
theory unclear about the relation between the subject of the picture and experienced 
resemblance in outline shape. Recall the objections that Lopes mentions10, some of 
 
10 Refer to chapter six. 
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the objections attack the ambiguity of the notion of ‘experienced resemblance’. 
What is ‘experienced resemblance in outline shape’? One may answer that it is the 
resemblance in outline shape that one experiences via perception. The resemblance 
takes two forms. The first kind of resemblance actually tracks the actual 
resemblance. For example, the marks on a picture of an apple in Albertian style 
match the outline shape of an apple, thus one experiences the resemblance in outline 
shape between the marks and the outline shape of the apple. The second kind of 
resemblance experienced does not track the actual resemblance. A cube drawn in 
parallel oblique perspective mentioned by Lopes (2006, 164) is an excellent example 
of the second kind of experienced resemblance. The cube depicted does not 
resemble the outline shape of a cube as usually depicted, but people intuitively agree 
that it depicts a cube. Idiosyncratic experience can also be the source of this kind of 
experienced resemblance. I may experience a facial resemblance between my friend 
and a movie star, however, other may disagree with my idea.  
Although Hopkins never makes the distinction, from the manner he talks about 
experienced resemblance, the first kind of resemblance certainly counts as 
‘experienced resemblance’ in Hopkins’s theory. However, the second kind of 
resemblance is more controversial. As Hopkins points out, resemblance is a relation 
between particulars. I may claim that two toy dolls resemble each other by looking 
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at their appearance. Finding out the actual resemblance between two particulars is an 
empirical matter 11 . Experienced resemblance is more complicated. It is 
unproblematic that pictures are able to depict both particulars and kinds. When one 
says that a picture depicts a dog, a poodle for example, but not a particular dog, 
according to Hopkins’s theory, one experiences resemblance between the marks on 
the surface of the picture and the outline shape of a poodle. However, in order to 
experience the resemblance, one has to know how the marks look, and have ideas 
about how the outline shape of a poodle looks. Without knowing these two things, 
one cannot experience any resemblance between the two. One can easily know how 
the marks look by merely looking at the picture, but it is questionable how one 
knows what the outline shape of a poodle looks. A picture may represent a poodle 
from many different angles and distances, in order to experience the resemblance, 
one has to know the many outline shapes of a poodle from all the angles and 
distances, not to mention different pictorial styles and perspectives depicting the 
same thing or the same kind of thing differently, in order to see what objects are 
depicted by these pictures. The outline shapes of objects that we perceive in 
 
11 The notion of actual resemblance is suspicious since it is necessary for us to 
perceive the actual resemblance, thus actual resemblance reduces to experienced 
resemblance, and resemblance is always experiential. However, I do not pursue this 
issue here, and grant that there is distinction between actual resemblance and 
experienced resemblance. 
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everyday life are extremely inadequate. Hopkins’s notion of experienced 
resemblance also violates our views about many pictures and photograph. One major 
aesthetic value of pictures and photographs is that they lead us to appreciate the 
world and everyday objects from different angles and perspectives, and we often see 
what is depicted with ease. If one needs to know the outline shape of the objects 
from all those angles before knowing what the pictures depict, this particular 
aesthetic value is strongly weakened. 
Hopkins may reply that both kinds of resemblance can be included in his sense 
of experienced resemblance, so experienced resemblance does not need to track 
actual resemblance. However, such a concession would blur the distinction between 
misrepresentation and accurate representation. A large proportion of pictures indeed 
depict with marks that do not track actual resemblance of the objects represented. If 
Hopkins allows that these pictures depict accurately given certain flexibility in 
outline shape (since experienced resemblance in outline shape does not precisely 
track actual resemblance in outline shape), one may wonder how large the flexibility 
is. An accurate depiction with a slightly varied outline shape and a misrepresentation 
are merely variations of degree of the outline shapes that match the object. Hopkins 
may need to clarify the distinction between a misrepresentation and an accurate 
depiction that diverges from the actual resemblance. 
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Problems with Indeterminacy 
 My final objection to the theory concerns the notion of indeterminacy. Hopkins 
states clearly that indeterminacy differs from misrepresentation in the sense that the 
former refers to an empty or missing attribution with regard to certain properties, 
and the latter refers to a present but inaccurate attribution of properties. The problem 
is how one can determine whether the object depicted in a picture is indeterminate or 
misrepresented? A portrait with no mouth can be a misrepresentation or a picture 
with an indeterminacy with respect to the mouth properties. Another example is the 
stick figure used by Hopkins to introduce the notion of indeterminacy. Why must the 
stick figure be an indeterminate figure, but not a misrepresentation? Hopkins does 
not explicitly discuss the distinction. One possible reply is to appeal to knowledge of 
pictorial conventions and pictorial styles. However, this reply would lead to the 
same problem of explaining depiction by experienced resemblance in outline shape 
in some pictorial styles featured in distortion or segmentation: we see the depicted 
object only by drawing on knowledge of the pictorial convention and pictorial styles 
together with experienced resemblance in outline shape 12 , but not solely by 
experienced resemblance in outline shape. This shows that experienced resemblance 
in outline shape is not solely necessary and sufficient for depiction. 
 
12 Maybe there is in fact knowledge of how outline shape is experienced as 
resembling in different pictorial styles. 
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 In this chapter, I have raised my criticisms of the experienced resemblance 
theory in outline shape based on Lopes’s critiques of the theory, and argued that the 
theory is problematic in, first, excluding photographs from depiction, and, second, in 
the ambiguous notion of ‘experienced resemblance in outline shape’, and finally, in 
the fuzzy distinction between misrepresentation and indeterminacy in outline shape.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
 In this thesis, I have surveyed contemporary debates on the notion of depiction, 
and raised my own objections to the existing theories. In chapter one, I introduced 
the questions concerning depiction, and then explained the questions in relation to 
the experience and understanding of pictures. In chapter two, I provided a brief 
introduction to the existing theories of depiction, including the resemblance theory, 
the experienced resemblance theory, the semiotic theory, the illusion theory, the 
seeing-in theory, the make-believe theory, and the recognition theory. In chapter 
three, I introduced Dominic Lopes’s aspect-recognition theory based on his book 
Understanding Pictures; and Robert Hopkins’s experienced resemblance theory in 
outline shape in chapter four, based on Hopkins’s book Pictures, Image and 
Experience. I then summarized the critiques of the aspect-recognition theory and the 
experienced resemblance theory in chapter five and chapter six respectively. After 
discussing the critiques offered by others, I raised my own objections to both 
theories in chapter seven and chapter eight. In chapter seven, I criticized the 
aspect-recognition theory. I contend, first, that this theory cannot explain 
misrepresentation unless it accepts that particular mental states are also sources of 
information; second, the notion of information needs further clarification, and its 
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ambiguity together with the notion of pictorial aspects leads to a consequence that 
all pictures are necessarily misrepresentational; third, I contend that the bold claim 
that pictures are belief-independent is false. In chapter eight, I criticized Hopkins’s 
experienced resemblance theory in outline shape by contending, first, that 
photographs are not included in pictorial representational pictures; and second, that 
the notion of ‘experienced resemblance in outline shape’ needs further clarification 
and explanation since the problem solved by the notion is no greater than the 
problem it creates; and third, the ambiguity of the notion of ‘experienced 
resemblance’ blurs the distinction between misrepresentation and indeterminacy in 
outline shape.  
 The discussion of question about depiction has been receiving increasing 
amounts of attention. Better and better candidate theories have emerged during the 
last few decades. However, in light of the various alternatives and criticisms I have 
discussed in this thesis, as well as my own criticisms of the two most prominent and 
influential philosophical theories, I conclude that although we are making progress, 
especially with regard to the clarification of questions, we still do not have anything 
like a comprehensive final theory of depiction.  
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